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SUI-GENERICIDE
Jorge L. Contreras 1
Working Draft May 21, 2019
ABSTRACT
Generic terms – those that describe a general class of goods or
services -- are not eligible for trademark protection. Firms have
historically gone to great lengths to prevent their trademarks from
becoming generic – a fate often referred to as genericide. But in a
few rare cases, firms have voluntarily declared certain terms that
they have created to be generic, a phenomenon that I refer to as
“sui-genericide”. This article explores the little-discussed
phenomenon of sui-genericide, both its origins in governmentsponsored programs of the mid-twentieth century and its most
recent incarnation in the area of technical interoperability
standards. Though the voluntary relinquishment of the exclusive
rights conferred by patents and copyrights has been studied
extensively in the literature, there has been comparatively little
scholarly attention to such mechanisms under trademark law. This
article examines the potential effects of sui-genericide on producer
incentives, follow-on innovation and consumer welfare and
considers some of the ramifications of incorporating a suigenericide doctrine into the law. It concludes by recommending
potential measures to enhance the legal recognition of declarations
of sui-genericide. These include official consideration during
trademark prosecution of “consensus” lists of common terms that
are developed by broadly-representative industry groups and the
creation of a presumption of genericness for terms that appear on
such lists, together with international harmonization of this
recognition.
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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property rights confer on their owners exclusive
rights to exploit inventions, works of authorship and marks for
specified periods of time. These rights, particularly when held by
business entities, are often viewed as valuable assets, and significant
resources are devoted to obtaining, securing and enforcing them
against others. Yet prominent examples exist in which holders of
valuable intellectual property voluntarily relinquish some or all of
their exclusive rights to the public.2 Such contributions may take the
form of either outright gifts of the relevant IP rights to the public
domain or of contractual or pseudo-contractual licenses or “pledges”
by rights holders.
For centuries, the author of a copyrighted work has been
permitted to make of his composition a “gift to the public”. 3 Today,
more formal mechanisms exist for dedicating copyrighted works to
the public, including a standardized online tool offered by the nonprofit Creative Commons. 4 When a copyrighted work – a novel, a
song, a photograph -- enters the public domain, it becomes free for
all to use and modify without restriction. 5
In the case of patents, there are various mechanisms by which
inventors may intentionally abandon or dedicate their inventions to
the public. Firms may release information via publication in order
to prevent it from becoming the subject of patents. 6 And an applicant

2

The focus of this article is on the intentional relinquishment of IP rights. It
is also the case that IP rights may be forfeited through involuntary mechanisms,
either through the neglect or inattention of the owner, or in response to challenges
by third parties. The effect of extinguishing such rights is similar, whether caused
by voluntary or involuntary means.
3
Miller v. Taylor, [1769] 4 Burr 2303, 2345-46 (98 E.R. 201). But see Phillip
Johnson, Dedicating Copyright to the Public Domain, 71 MODERN L. REV. 587,
595 (2008) (questioning precedential authority of this case).
4
Creative Commons, CC0 1.0 Universal (CC0 1.0) Public Domain
Dedication
(last
visited
Mar.
2,
2019),
https://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/
[hereinafter
CC0
Dedication].
5
See Golan v. Holder, 132 S.Ct. 873, 892 (“When a copyrighted work – a
novel, a song, a photograph -- is dedicated to the public domain by its owner, it
becomes free for all to use and modify without restriction.”)
6
See, e.g., Jorge L. Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy: Patents, Policy and the
Design of the Genome Commons, 12 MINN. J.L., SCI. & TECH. 61 (2011)
(placement of genetic data into public domain by pharmaceutical industry to avoid
patenting by others); Oren Bar-Gill & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Value of
Giving Away Secrets, 89 VA. L. REV. 1857, 1857 (2003) (“In growing numbers,

3
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may deliberately abandon a patent application before it is fully
prosecuted,7 after which the invention claimed in the application
will become part of the public domain. Once abandoned, it cannot
be patented by somebody else and will act as prior art defeating
subsequent attempts to patent the disclosed invention and even new
inventions that are obvious in view of that invention.8 The same is
true when a patent expires, either at the end of its term or due to its
owner’s failure to pay maintenance fees. 9 The inventions claimed by
an expired patent can never again by claimed by another: they are
forever part of the public domain.
Likewise, the phenomenon of pledging IP rights to the public
has been observed and analyzed extensively in the literature. 10
Notable examples include, under copyright law, open source
software licensing,11 the distribution of free content by online
platforms,12 and the dissemination of large amounts of userdeveloped content under Creative Commons licenses,13 and, under
patent law, the pledging of patents to promote new technology

firms elect to forego patent protection, and choose instead to publish potentially
patentable research findings”).
7
37 C.F.R. § 1.138(a) (“An application may be expressly abandoned by filing
a written declaration of abandonment identifying the application in the United
States Patent and Trademark Office.”) Though under some circumstances, an
inventor may revive a patent application after it has been abandoned. 35 U.S.C.
27.
8
See, e.g., Vass v. Multi Med Indus., 204 USPQ 1071, 1073 (E.D. N.Y. 1979)
(“Reference in [patent] 575 to the abandoned application 106 disclosed the claims
to the public and became part of the body of prior art.”).
9
Figueroa v. United States, 466 F.3d 1023, 1027 (Fed. Cir. 2006), cert.
denied, 550 U.S. 933 (2007) (“failure to pay required maintenance fees results in
expiration of the patent, 35 U.S.C. § 41(b)”). See also 4 Chisum on Patents §
11.02.
10
See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Opening the Patent System: Diffusionary
Levers in Patent Law, 89 S. CAL. L. REV. 793 (2016); Jorge L. Contreras, Patent
Pledges, 47 ARIZ. ST. UNIV. L.J. 543 (2015); Abraham Bell & Gideon
Parchomovsky, The Evolution of Private and Open Access Property, 10
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 77 (2008); Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in
the Public Domain, 17 U. CHI. L. REV. 183 (2004).
11
See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS : HOW SOCIAL
PRODUCTION TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006) (discussing open
source code); Merges, supra note 10, at 186 (discussing IBM’s Linux strategy).
12
See Jonathan Barnett, The Costs of Free: Commodification, Bundling and
Concentration, USC Gould Center for Law and Social Science Research Papers
Series No CLASS17-9 (2017) (describing rise of free content on online
platforms).
13
See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Creative Commons, 55 FLORIDA L. REV.
763 (2003).

4
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platforms,14 interoperability standards, 15 and social causes,16 and to
preempt the appropriation of rights by others.17 When such pledges
are legally enforceable and irrevocable, they act as partial
relinquishments of rights to the public. 18
Trademarks, like other forms of intellectual property, can have
substantial value. As noted by Professor Barton Beebe, marks like
APPLE, GOOGLE, SAMSUNG, TOYOTA, MCDONALDS, STARBUCKS, NIKE,
COKE, and PEPSI are “instantly recognizable by a very large
proportion of humanity, [and] are among the most valuable and
influential signs in the world, rivalling in significance many
religious and national symbols.” 19
Yet, with a few exceptions, little scholarly attention has been
paid to expanding the public domain under trademark law. These
exceptions include a strain of literature addressing the development
of naming systems outside the boundaries of conventional
trademark protection (e.g., the fanciful pseudonyms used by roller
derby participants),20 and recent work by Professors Daniel Hemel
and Lisa Ouellette that considers both doctrinal and technological
measures that have the potential to expand the stockpile of words
and symbols available for use in identifying goods and services –
the “semantic commons”. 21 And, of course, a host of scholars over
the years have critiqued the breadth of various protective doctrines
14

See Chien, Levers, supra note 10; Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note

10.
15

See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 10.
See Jorge L Contreras, Bronwyn H Hall & Christian Helmers, Pledging
Patents for the Public Good (assessment of prominent green technology pledge);
Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 10 (identification of pledges made for
philanthropic reasons).
17
Contreras, Bermuda’s Legacy, supra note 6, at x (placement of genetic data
into public domain by pharmaceutical industry to avoid appropriation by
biotechnology firms); Merges, supra note 10, at 186 (IBM’s Linux strategy as a
response to Microsoft).
18
See Jorge L. Contreras, A Market Reliance Theory for FRAND
Commitments and Other Patent Pledges, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 479, x (2015).
19
BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN SOURCE CASEBOOK, Intro.
at 2 (4th ed. 2017).
20
See David Fagundes, Labor and/as Love: Roller Derby as Constructed
Cultural Commons, in GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS, Ch. 13 (Brett
Frischmann, Michael Madison, Katherine Strandburg, eds., 2014).
21
Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Governing the Semantic
Commons (working draft May 26, 2018, on file with author) (defining “semantic
commons” as “the supply of words, sounds, and symbols that can be readily used
to describe tangible and intangible items—and, in particular, to describe products,
services, and their sources”.) This effort responds in part to empirical work
showing that the available store of common English words is running out. Barton
Beebe & Jeanne C. Fromer, Are We Running Out of Trademarks? An Empirical
Study of Trademark Depletion and Congestion, 131 HARV. L. REV. 945 (2018).
16

5
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under trademark law, arguing that they should be narrowed in one
way or another. 22 However, none of this work tackles head-on the
question whether and how trademarks might be contributed by their
owners to build a common pool of resources, nor whether such a
commons is even desirable.
One of the impediments to this line of reasoning may be inherent
limitations imposed by trademark law itself. Unlike patent and
copyright law, which offer mechanisms by which inventions and
works of authorship may be dedicated to the public domain,
trademark law offers no explicit mechanism by which mark owners
may place a particular word, term or device into the public domain.
Though a trademark application may expressly be abandoned by
the applicant, the effect of abandonment is not the same as it is for a
patent application. When a trademark application seeking protection
for a mark is abandoned, the mark may become the subject of a new
application by anyone else who wishes to use the mark. The same
principle applies when a registered trademark is not renewed,23 a
trademark is abandoned due to non-use24 or a registration is
otherwise canceled.25 The expiration and cancelation of a mark do
not prevent a subsequent claimant from appropriating the mark for
itself. In fact, even while arguing for an explicit statutory regime to
facilitate the dedication of patents and copyrights to the public
domain, One scholar considers trademarks to be so different in kind
from these other forms of IP that they are expressly excluded from
his proposed statutory scheme to expand the public domain.26
And trademarks may, indeed, be very different than patents and
copyrights inasmuch as they bear even less resemblance to
traditional forms of property than these other forms of intellectual
property. Professor Adam Mossoff, in arguing that trademarks
should be treated as use-based (usufructury) property rights,
acknowledges the prevailing view that a trademark is considered “a
22
See, e.g., Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First
Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2005) (arguing for limitation of trademark
rights to foster free speech); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48
EMORY L.J. 367, 391-410 (1999) (criticizing trademark protection for trade
dress); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999) (critiquing as over-broad doctrines such
as trademark dilution, trade dress protection, and anti-cybersquatting).
23
cite
24
See Lanham Act, § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (“A mark shall be deemed to be
‘abandoned’ (a) when its use has been discontinued with intent not to resume…”)
25
cite
26
Clark D. Asay, A Case for the Public Domain, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 753, 799
(2013) (“Waiving trademark rights is inadvisable since doing so may result in
significant consumer confusion.”)
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regulatory entitlement whose function is to increase social welfare
by reducing consumer search costs”. 27 If so, then it is easy to see
why such an entitlement, when renounced by its “owner”, would not
thereafter be made available to the general public any more than the
social security check renounced by an individual recipient would be
given to someone else requesting it.
Professor William Landes and Judge Richard Posner describe
the potential effects of the differential treatment of abandonment
observed between patents and copyrights, on one hand, and
trademarks, on the other: “When property is abandoned, the law’s
choice is between “depropertizing” it, so that anyone can use it but
no one can establish an exclusive right to its use, and allowing it to
be reappropriated, which may make for more efficient use but may
also incite rent seeking by competing would-be reappropriators.”28
As discussed above, the abandonment of patents and copyrights falls
into the former category, while the abandonment of trademarks falls
into the later. Thus, there is no affirmative procedural mechanism
that enables a trademark owner to contribute his or her mark to the
public or to make it available for public use.
This being said, marks can and do lose their protected status
under one particular set of circumstances: when they are found to be
generic. Generic terms – those which lack distinctiveness and
describe a generic class of goods or services – cannot be enforced as
trademarks or registered by others.29 A finding of genericness,
however, cannot be initiated by a mark owner. It results either from
the action of the trademark examiner during the prosecution process
or the challenge of a third party either in an opposition or
cancellation proceeding or litigation. 30
This article, for the first time, identifies and describes the
practice of “sui-genericide”,31 whereby a private actor declares that
27

Adam Mossoff, Trademark as a Property Right, 107 KY. L.J. __, 3 (2018).
For critiques of Mossoff’s thesis, see, e.g., Bryan L. Frye, Metaphors on
Trademark: A Response to Adam Mossoff, “Trademark as a Property Right”, 107
KY. L. J. ONLINE (2018); Camilla Alexandra Hrdy, Adam Mossoff: Trademarks
As Property, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION Blog (Sept. 5, 2017, 9:52 PM),
https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2017/09/adam-mossoff-trademarks-asproperty.html.
28
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 28-29 (2003).
29
See Part I, infra.
30
See Part x, infra.
31
The term “sui-genericide” is derived from “genericide”, a challenge to a
trademark on the basis that it is generic (see note 55, infra), and “sui”, a prefix
derived from the Latin term meaning “of oneself”. See Online Etymology
Dictionary, suicide, https://www.etymonline.com/word/suicide (visited Apr. 27,

7
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a particular word or term is generic and thereby seeks to commit it
to the public domain. Far from the fringe of commercial activity,
this practice has existed for decades in areas such as pharmaceutical
and pesticide common names, and more recently has emerged with
respect to the names of pervasive interoperability standards such as
HTML, XML and USB that are embodied in billions of products
around the world.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows: Part I reviews
current U.S. law relating to trademark genericism, including its
doctrinal and economic roots.32 Part II explores the phenomenon of
sui-genericide – the intentional declaration that one’s own mark is
generic – both in several historical contexts and more recently in the
area of technical standards. Part III explores the rationales and
explanations for sui-genericide, and Part IV poses the question how,
and whether, sui-genericide, can be facilitated through existing and
new legal mechanisms such as registries, presumptions and
certifications.

I. GENERICISM AND GENERICIDE TODAY
A.

Genericism Defined

The degree of distinctiveness exhibited by a trademark affects
both its eligibility for registration and its enforceability.
Distinctiveness is generally classified into four categories
enumerated by the Second Circuit in Abercrombie and Fitch Co. v.

2019). The term also alludes to the Latin term sui generis, used frequently
discussions of intellectual property to denote a new form of protection beyond
existing statutory or common law forms (e.g., whether software should be
protected by copyright, patent or a sui generis form of protection). See Sui
Generis, The Law Dictionary, https://thelawdictionary.org/sui-generis/ (“of its
own kind or class”).
32
The focus of this article is on U.S. law. However, the trademark-limiting
effect of genericism has been recognized in other jurisdictions including the
European Union, as well as under the Paris Convention. See ECJ C-191/01,
EUIPO v Wm Wrigley Jr Co; [2003] E.C.R. I-12447, para. 25 and 31 (exclusion
of generic terms from trademark protection “serves the public interest of leaving
terms free to be used by all traders and thereby prevents such terms from being
reserved to one undertaking only”); Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property, Art. 6.B (trademarks may not be denied registration or
invalidated except when they are “devoid of any distinctive character, or consist
exclusively of signs or indications which may serve, in trade, to designate the
kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, place of origin, of the goods, or
the time of production, or have become customary in the current language or in
the bona fide and established practices of the trade of the country where protection
is claimed”).

8
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Hunting World, Inc.33 Under the Abercrombie framework, marks
that are either fanciful (invented terms such as EXXON, TYLENOL and
PRIUS) or arbitrary (common words applied in an unfamiliar
manner, such as PUMA used for sporting gear) are the strongest and
are viewed as inherently distinctive. 34 Marks that are suggestive
(words that require “imagination, thought and perception to reach a
conclusion as to the nature of goods”, such as “Microsoft” for
computer software),35 are also distinctive. However, words that are
merely descriptive of the goods or services that they name, such as
“App Store” for an online platform for distributing software
applications, may not be registered without an additional showing
of secondary meaning (i.e., that the mark has come to identify the
source of the goods or services in the public eye). 36 And, finally,
terms that are generic, connoting a general category to which a
particular product belongs (e.g., car, savings bank, lawnmower) but
which give no specific indication of the product’s source, are viewed
as not being distinctive and receive no trademark protection
whatsoever.37 Though these rules may, at first glance, appear
straightforward, the determination whether a particular term is
generic or descriptive can be a difficult one.38
As the Federal Circuit has explained,
A generic mark, being the ultimate in
descriptiveness, cannot acquire distinctiveness. This
is so because generic terms are by definition
incapable of indicating source, and therefore are the
antithesis of trademarks, and can never attain
trademark status.39
A common test applied by the courts to determine whether a
mark is generic is whether the “primary significance of the
registered mark to the relevant public is as the name for a particular
type of good or service irrespective of its source.”40 As further

33
537 F.2d 4 (2nd Cir. 1976). Other circuits have largely followed the
Abercrombie framework. [cite McCarthy?]
34
Id. at ¶12.
35
Id. at ¶18.
36
See id. at ¶6 and 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f).
37
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at ¶12. See also 15 U.S.C. 1064(c) (a federal
registration is subject to cancellation if at any time it "becomes the common
descriptive name of an article or substance.")
38
See A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 296 (3d Cir. 1986)
(“Courts and commentators have recognized the difficulties of distinguishing
between suggestive, descriptive, and generic marks.”)
39
Royal Crown Co., Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co. *10 (Fed. Cir., Jun. 20, 2018).
40
Ty Inc. v. Softbelly’s Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 531 (7th Cir. 2003).

9
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explained by the Third Circuit in E.T. Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare
Products, Inc.,
[T]he primary significance test … inquires whether
the primary significance of a term in the minds of the
consuming public is the product or the producer. We
ask whether consumers think the term represents the
generic name of the product [or service] or a mark
indicating merely one source of that product [or
service]. If the term refers to the product (i.e., the
genus), the term is generic. If, on the other hand, it
refers to one source or producer of that product, the
term is not generic (i.e., it is descriptive, suggestive,
or arbitrary or fanciful). To give an example, “Cola”
is generic because it refers to a product, whereas
“Pepsi Cola” is not generic because it refers to the
producer.41
Or, put more simply by the Ninth Circuit in Filipino Yellow
Pages, Inc. v. Asian Journal Publications, Inc.,42 a distinctive mark
answers the questions ‘Who are you?’ ‘Where do you come from?’
‘Who vouches for you?’ But the [generic] name of the product
answers the question ‘What are you?’”.43
In addition, for a mark to be deemed generic, it must relate to
the particular type of good or service for which the mark is
registered. That is, even if a term has a generic meaning in some
contexts, it may not be generic as to the particular good or service
for which it acts as a mark. As noted by the Ninth Circuit in Google,
this requirement is necessary “to maintain the viability of arbitrary
marks as a protectable trademark category”. 44 That is, “[i]f there
were no requirement that a claim of genericide relate to a particular
type of good, then a mark like IVORY, which is arbitrary as applied
to soap, could be cancelled outright because it is generic when used
to describe a product made from the tusks of elephants.”45
As a result, much depends on how an adjudicatory body
interprets the relevant product or service genus to which the term is
41

538 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted). See also
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (genericness “refers, or has come to be understood as
referring, to the genus of which the particular product is a species.”)
42
198 F.3d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1999).
43
Id. (citing Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1323, 1324
(9th Cir.1993)).
44
Google, 860 F.3d at *9.
45
Id. (citing Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 4, 9 n.6 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).

10
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applied. In Google, the Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s ruling
that the term GOOGLE was not generic. It reasoned that even if a
majority of the public uses the verb “google” indiscriminately to
refer to Internet searching, this does not mean that GOOGLE has
become a generic term for Internet search engines.46
In In re Cordua Rests., Inc.,47 the Federal Circuit further
complicated the analysis by holding that “a term can be generic for
a genus of goods or services if the relevant public . . . understands
the term to refer to a key aspect of that genus.”48 For example, “the
term ‘pizzeria’ would be generic for restaurant services, even though
the public does not understand the term to refer to the broad class of
restaurants as a whole; the public need only understand that the term
refers to ‘a particular sub-group or type of restaurant rather than to
all restaurants.’”49
Thus, in Royal Crown v. The Coca Cola Co., the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) upheld The Coca Cola Company’s
registration of the mark ZERO to describe its line of no-calorie soft
drinks. Royal Crown brought an opposition challenging the mark,
arguing, among other things, that the term ZERO was generic. In
analyzing RC’s genericism challenge, the TTAB defined the
relevant genus as “soft drinks, sports drinks, and energy drinks.” 50
The Federal Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that “The
[TTAB] failed to consider whether the relevant consuming public
would consider the term ZERO to be generic for a subcategory of the
claimed genus of beverages—i.e., the subcategory of the claimed
beverages encompassing the specialty beverage categories of drinks
with few or no calories or few or no carbohydrates.” 51
But even if certain terms are found to be generic, they may still
form part of otherwise distinctive marks. For example, the mark
DYNAMITE for a take-out TexMex restaurant chain is likely arbitrary
under the Abercrombie framework (given the lack of any actual
connection between explosives and TexMex food). Yet the term
BURRITO for a TexMex restaurant is almost certainly generic. Thus,
to avoid any implication that the owner of the DYNAMITE BURRITO
Id. at *20 (noting that the challenger failed to prove that “there is no way
to describe ‘internet search engines’ without calling them “googles” and further
observing that “not a single competitor calls its search engine “a google,” and …
members of the consuming public recognize and refer to different “internet search
engines”).
47
823 F.3d 594 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
48
Id. at 603.
49
Royal Crown, at *12-13 (quoting In re. Cordua, 823 F.3d at 605).
50
Id. at *11.
51
Id. at *13.
46

11
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restaurant chain could claim rights in the word burrito itself, the
PTO generally requires that generic terms included within registered
marks be disclaimed as to standalone uses.52 Thus, the owner of
DYNAMITE BURRITO would likely have an infringement claim against
its competitor Dynamite Tacos, but not against Chihuahua Burrito.
B.

Challenging Marks as Generic

A mark may be found to be generic in one of two principal ways:
at the outset, when it is refused registration by the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO),53 or after registration, when a oncedistinctive mark is shown no longer to identify a source of goods
and on that basis is canceled.54 This latter circumstance is sometimes
referred to as “genericide”.55 There is a long list of U.S. trademarks
that have been canceled due to genericide: ASPIRIN, BRASSIERE, ETICKET, ESCALATOR, LINOLEUM, THERMOS, TRAMPOLINE and ZIPPER,
to name just a few.56
52

See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF., TRADEMARK M ANUAL OF
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1213.03(c) (Oct. 2018) [hereinafter TMEP] (“If a mark
is comprised in part of matter that, as applied to the goods or services, is generic
or does not function as a mark, the matter must be disclaimed to permit
registration…”); Royal Crown Co., Inc. v. The Coca-Cola Co., slip op. at 3-4
(Fed. Cir., Jun. 20, 2018) (discussing disclaimer of term “ZERO” in beverage
companies’ diet soda marks).
53
See, e.g., BARTON BEEBE, TRADEMARK LAW: AN OPEN SOURCE
CASEBOOK, Part I, p. 45 (4th ed. 2017) (listing numerous examples and cases);
LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW:
CASES AND M ATERIALS 515 (5th ed., 2017)).
54
Lanham Act, Sec. x.
55
The term “genericide” was reportedly coined by the U.S. Trademark
Association as a pejorative moniker designed to alert its members to the “danger”
of genericism. See Walter P. Margulies, How the F.T.C. Threatens Trademarks,
N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1979. See also GLYNN LUNNEY, C ASES AND MATERIALS ON
TRADEMARK LAW 180 (2nd ed. 2015) (“Because of their antagonism towards the
doctrine, trademark plaintiffs' attorneys … coined the term "genericide" to capture
their sense that finding a trademark generic unfairly punishes successful
trademark owners. By relabeling a court's decision that a term is or has become
generic as genericide, the trademark bar attempted to link findings that a claimed
trademark is generic with homicide or genocide, and other "-cides" that are
inherently wrong.”) Despite its partisan origins, the term “genericide” has now
entered the trademark lexicon and is used generally to mean the loss of trademark
rights through a finding of genericism. See, e.g., J. THOMAS MCCARTHY,
MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:1 (4th ed. 1998);
Beebe, supra note 53, at 45, LOREN & MILLER, supra note 53, at 515; JEROME
GILSON & ANNE GILSON LALONDE, 1 GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 2.02 (2017);
Jacqueline Stern, Genericide: Cancellation of a Registered Trademark, 51
FORDHAM L. REV. 666 (1983); Sung In, Death of a Trademark: Genericide in the
Digital Age, 21 REV. LITIG. 159 (2002); John Dwight Ingram, The Genericide of
Trademarks, 2 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 154 (2004).
56
See, e.g., McCarthy, supra note 55, at x (listing numerous marks that have
become generic); Ralph A. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic
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The risk of genericide is highest for products that introduce a
new technology to the marketplace, as consumers may quickly come
to associate the product’s brand with its functionality and begin to
use the brand to describe the general class of products to which it
belongs.57 This risk is particularly pronounced for products that are
patented, such that there is only one product/brand on the market
during the period of patent exclusivity. 58 This is the “trap” into
which Bayer fell with respect to its patented painkiller “aspirin”. As
explained by Professor John Ingram, “during the life of the patent
Bayer made no attempt to establish in the minds of the public some
generic name for the product other than "aspirin." In fact, they
welcomed the public acceptance and use of "aspirin" as the name of
the drug. By the time the patent expired, it was too late. "Aspirin"
was generic.”59
A registered mark may be challenged as generic via one of four
procedural routes:
(1) The mark, once allowed by the PTO, will be
published in the Official Gazette, following which
any person “who believes that he or she would be
damaged by the registration of [the] mark” may,
within thirty days after publication, initiate an inter
partes opposition proceeding at the Trademark Trial
and Appeals Board (TTAB). 60 At the opposition
proceeding, any ground for rejection of the mark may
be raised including that the mark lacks
distinctiveness due to genericism.
(2) Under Section 14(3) of the Lanham Act, any
person who believes that he or she would be
Words, 89 YALE L.J. 1323, 1324 (1980); Beebe, supra note 53, at 45; Loren &
Miller, supra note 53, at 515. Though genericism is typically discussed in terms
of trademarks for products and services, certification marks may also be subject
to genericide. Community of Roquefort v. William Faehndrich, Inc., 303 F.2d
494, 497 (2d Cir. 1962) (“if an indication of regional origin, registered as a
certification mark, becomes a generic term for a certain type of goods coming
from any region, then the mark is subject to cancellation”).
57
See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An
Economic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 295 (1987) (“a difficult problem of
determining whether a trademark has become a generic name arises in cases … in
which the trademark owner initially has a product monopoly”).
58
See Ingram, supra note 55, at 158-59.
59
Id.
60
15 U.S.C. § 1063(a); 37 C.F.R. 2.101-107. See also GRAEME B.
DINWOODIE & M ARK D. JANIS, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW
AND POLICY (4th ed. 2014) (outlining opposition procedure).
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damaged by the registration of a mark may petition
to cancel a registration at any time “if the registered
mark becomes the generic name for the goods or
services”.61
(3) In private litigation, one party, usually as a
defense to an allegation of infringement, may
counterclaim that an asserted mark is invalid as
generic.62
(4) A public agency such as the U.S. Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) may petition the PTO to cancel a
trademark as generic.63
61

15 U.S.C. § 1064(3).
McCarthy
63
15 U.S.C. § 1064 (specifically authorizing FTC cancelation proceedings
based on genericism). The history of the FTC’s exercise of its power under
Section 14 of the Lanham Act is somewhat checkered. See, generally, John M.
Fietkiewicz, Section 14 of the Lanham Act--FTC Authority to Challenge Generic
Trademarks, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 437 (1980). Its first two petitions for
cancelation of marks were rejected for lack of standing. FTC v. Elder Mfg. Co.,
84 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 429 (Comm'r Pat. 1950); FTC v. Royal Mfg. Co., 84 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 429 (Comm'r Pat. 1950). In 1958, 1960 and 1961, the FTC succeeded in
canceling three registrations on the basis of abandonment and fraud. FTC v.
Service Seed Co., Cancellation No. 7478 (T.T.A.B., filed May 2, 1960); FTC v.
Danne, Cancellation No. 7152 (Comm'r Pat., filed Aug. 5, 1958), Bart Schwartz
Int'l Textiles, Ltd. v. FTC, 289 F.2d 665 (C.C.P.A. 1961). But it was not until
1978 that the FTC brought an action under Section 14 to cancel a mark on the
basis of genericism. The mark in that case was FORMICA, owned by a subsidiary
of American Cyanamid Corporation, and the FTC asserted that the mark had
become the common descriptive name for “laminated sheets of wood, fabric or
paper impregnated with synthetic resin and consolidated under heat and pressure
for use on table tops, furniture and wall panelling.” FTC v. Formica Corp.,
Cancellation No. 11955 (T.T.A.B., filed May 31, 1978); Formica Corp. v.
Lefkowitz, 590 F.2d 915, 200 USPQ 641, 647 (CCPA 1979); Federal Trade
Commission v. Formica Corp., 200 USPQ 182, 191 (TTAB 1978). According to
the FTC, American Cyanamid had used the mark “to charge higher prices and to
stifle competition in the plastic laminates market costing consumers an estimated
$10 million a year.” FTC v. Formica, Cancellation No. 11955, Petition for
Cancellation at 1. The FTC’s action against Formica triggered strong responses.
The President of Formica Corp. is reported to have warned that the FTC’s
aggressive policing of generic trademarks “would have all American industries
selling their products in plain brown wrappers.” Margulies, supra note 55 (quoting
Martin B. Friedman). Spirited editorials condemned the FTC’s intervention, one
accusing it of “engendering an ‘identity crisis’ in American business.” Margulies,
supra note 55. One academic commentator characterized the relationship between
the FTC and trademark owners as a “religious war.” McCarthy, supra note 55, at
152. This public outcry led to Congressional hearings (Hearings on H.R. 3685
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of
Justice, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979)) and, eventually, the enactment of the FTC
Improvements Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-252, 94 Stat. 391 (1980), which,
among other things, prohibited the FTC from using any appropriated funds to
62
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While each of these mechanisms for challenging a mark as
generic requires different procedural steps, the substantive
requirements for a finding of genericism do not vary greatly from
one such mechanism to another. In each case, whether a challenged
mark is generic or descriptive is a question of fact. 64
A party bringing a cancellation action on the basis of genericism
bears the burden of proving genericide by a preponderance of the
evidence.65 The challenger’s task is made more difficult because the
holder of a registered trademark, after meeting its initial burden in
registration, benefits from a presumption of validity. 66
Despite the number of well-known marks that have fallen to
genericide, not all genericism challenges are successful. In some
cases, the evidence presented does not meet the required standard
for showing that a challenged mark has taken on generic meaning in
the public eye. For example, a San Diego jury found in 2017 that
Comic-Con International’s mark COMIC-CON was not generic after
a challenge by Salt Lake City Comic Con, a group accused of
infringing the mark. 67 In reaching its verdict, the jury seemingly
relied on evidence including a survey showing that 70% of
respondents considered COMIC-CON to be a particular brand rather
than a generic description of an event.
In other cases, the owner of a challenged mark may show that
the mark, even if it has taken on a generic meaning, is not being used
in a generic manner. The most notable example of this approach
arose in the highly-publicized genericism challenge to the mark
GOOGLE.68 In that case, the challenger petitioned the USPTO for
cancelation of the GOOGLE mark on the ground that “the word
‘google’ is primarily understood as ‘a generic term universally used
to describe the act[] of internet searching’”69 and that “verb use

petition to cancel the registration of any trademark on the basis of genericness for
the next three fiscal years. Id. at § 18. Yet even after this statutory prohibition
expired in 1982, it does not appear that the FTC ever again exercised its authority
under Section 14 of the Lanham Act to challenge a trademark as generic.
64
In re Hotels.com, LP, 573 F.3d 1300, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009)); In re Bayer
AG, 488 F.3d 960, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
65
Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., 684 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir.
1982).
66
Coca-Cola Co., 692 F.2d at 1254.
67
See Rob Salkowitz, Jury Decides For San Diego Comic-Con In Trademark
Suit, Forbes, Dec. 17, 2017 (discussing survey and other evidence relied upon by
jury in finding that COMIC-CON was not generic).
68
Elliott v. Google, Inc., 860 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2017).
69
Id. at *4.
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constitutes generic use as a matter of law”.70 But, as noted above,
this challenge was unsuccessful.71
Unlike other cancelation proceedings – resulting, for example,
from a mark owner’s failure to use a mark in commerce – a finding
of genericism will prevent others from registering the generic term
as a mark.72 Thus, like an abandonment of rights under patent or
copyright law, a finding of genericism generally has an estoppel
effect on third parties, re-committing the generic term to the
public.73
C.

Genericide Counter-Measures

It is often the case that the holders of intellectual property rights
will lose those rights based on their own conduct: failing to pay
renewal or maintenance fees, failing to disclose prior art to the
Patent and Trademark Office, misusing or abusing those rights in
commercial transactions, and so on. However, the loss of rights due
to genericism arises from the use of a mark not only by the mark
owner (though this is certainly possible), but also by competitors,
consumers, the media, and others.74 Given the large investments that
many firms make in building goodwill in their brand identities,
trademark owners often go to great lengths to control, or at least
influence, third party use of their marks so as to avoid claims of
genericism.75
There are generally three proactive approaches that mark owners
have taken to decrease the likelihood that their marks will become
generic. First, the mark owner can impose direct contractual
obligations on licensed users of the mark. Thus, in trademark license
agreements, it is common for mark owners to prohibit their licensees
from using the licensed marks in a manner that might lead to their
genericism. These prohibitions often include prohibitions on use of
the mark as a verb (e.g., don’t say “I am going to Xerox these
papers”) or as a noun (e.g., don’t say “Where is the Xerox of my
expense report?”). 76 And while such restrictions would not be
70

Id. at *5.
See notes 45-46, supra, and accompanying discussion.
72
See Fietkiewicz, supra note 63, at 455-56.
73
See id. Note, however, that under certain rare circumstances, a term that
has been adjudged generic may be revived if it is shown to have achieved
distinctiveness. See id. at n. 144; McCarthy at x.
74
See Ingram, supra note 55, at 161.
75
See, e.g., Johnson, Why Companies Don’t Want You to Take Their Brand
Names in Vain, ECONOMIST, Sep. 9, 2017.
76
See Ingram, supra note 55, at 160 (“Trademark owners should never use
the trademark as a verb or noun, which implies that the word is generic”). But see
71
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unexpected in sophisticated commercial arrangements between
mark owners and, for example, product manufacturers and
distributors, these types of anti-genericide provisions also appear in
mass market agreements that are intended for a much broader
audience.77
Second, mark owners can take their anti-genericide campaigns
directly to the public – to users of consumers and products beyond
contractual licensees. This sort of direct intervention can come in
the form of product advertising, in which the mark owner reminds
consumers that its mark designates a particular brand of product
rather than the product itself. For example, Landes and Posner
describe how General Foods diligently advertised the first widelydistributed decaffeinated coffee as “Sanka-brand decaffeinated
coffee” rather than simply “Sanka”. 78 General Foods succeeded in
preventing Sanka from becoming a generic term, and in promoting
the alternative generic term “decaf”. 79
Xerox Corporation is perhaps the best known proponent of the
direct-to-consumer counter-measure ad, producing a large quantity
of advertising designed not to promote its products, but to protect its
trademark.80 In the following clever advertisement, for example,
Xerox evokes the genericism of the earlier mark zipper, pleading
with readers not to use the term XEROX as a synonym for
“photocopy”:

id. (“Of course, using a trademark only as an adjective and not as a verb is no
guarantee that the mark will not be held to be generic. For example, "Light Beer"
and "Lite Beer" were held "to be generic names for a type of beer light in body or
taste and low in alcoholic and caloric content."' The same thing happened with
"matchbox" toys and "safari" clothing.” (citations omitted)).
77
See, e.g., Oracle Corp., Java Licensing Logo Guidelines,
http://www.oracle.com/us/technologies/java/java-licensing-logo-guidelines1908204.pdf (2016); Bluetooth SIG, Bluetooth Trademark License Agreement
(E-Sign Version 1.3 – Last Revised Dec. 14, 2016).
78
Landes & Posner, supra note 57, at 294.
79
Id. Other successful genericide counter-measure campaigns include
Chrysler’s “They invented “SUV” because they can’t call them Jeep®”; Johnson
& Johnson’s “I am stuck on Band-Aids brand cause Band-Aid’s stuck on me”;
and Kimberly-Clark’s “ ‘Kleenex’ is a brand name…and should always be
followed by an ® and the word ‘Tissue.’ Help us keep our identity, ours.” Gary
H. Fechter & Elina Slavin, Practical Tips on Avoiding Genericide, 66 INTA
BULLETIN, Nov. 15, 2011.
80
See, e.g. Ingram, supra note 55, at 161.
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Figure 1
Xerox Genericide Counter-Measure Ad81
In ads like the one shown in Figure 1, the mark owner identifies
a generic term that can be used instead of the trademark to describe
the function of the product – its genus (e.g., “copy” or “photocopy”)
– while reserving the trademark to identify the source of the product
(e.g., a Xerox copier). Other attempts to append generic terms to
product brand names include Scotch transparent tape, Kleenex facial
tissue, Vaseline petroleum jelly, and Rollerblade in-line skates.82 As
noted by Professors Lydia Loren and Joe Miller, “If the Otis
Elevator Company, inventor of the escalator, had promoted the
product as a “moving stairway,” escalator might still be a
trademark.”83

81

Xerox Corp., Advertisement, ABA Journal (2010) (reproduced in Liz
Johnstone, Dallas-Connected Xerox Corporation Probably Still Needs Your Help,
FrontBurner,
Nov.
13,
2012,
https://www.dmagazine.com/frontburner/2012/11/dallas-connected-xeroxcorporation-probably-still-needs-your-help/). Additional Xerox ads in this vein
may be found in ABA Journal, Feb. 2008 (reproduced in Loren & Miller, supra
note 53, at 515) (again referencing zipper), Ingram, supra note 55, at 161 n.58
(referencing ‘aspirin’) and Fechter & Slavin, supra note 79 (“You can’t Xerox a
Xerox on a Xerox. But we don’t mind at all if you copy a copy on a Xerox®
copier”). Note that Xerox’s requests may be overly prescriptive. As noted by the
Ninth Circuit in Google, “verb use does not automatically constitute generic use”.
Google, 860 F.3d at *17.
82
See Loren & Miller, supra note 53, at 515; Ingram, supra note 55, at 15960, 162.
83
Loren & Miller, supra note 53, at 515.
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The third general approach taken by mark owners to protect their
marks from becoming generic has been to police improper uses of
the mark in the marketplace and then request that users cease and
desist those uses, sometimes threatening litigation if they fail to
comply.84 Professor John Ingram describes this approach as
employed by The Coca-Cola Company, the owner of one of the most
valuable marks in the world:
Coca-Cola employs people to visit retail
establishments which do not serve Coca-Cola
products and specifically order Coca-Cola or a Coke.
If the establishment serves a cola-type beverage
without comment, the Coca-Cola employees send a
sample of the beverage to Coca-Cola's laboratory for
chemical analysis. If the beverage is determined to
not be a Coca-Cola product, the company will ask
that retail establishment to stop the deceptive
practice. If the practice continues, Coca-Cola will
bring suit for trademark infringement. 85
Of course, these prophylactic measures do not guaranty that a
mark will not be challenged as generic, and many cancelation
proceedings have been brought and won even after mark owners
have taken such precautions.
D.

The Economics of Genericide

More than thirty years ago, Professor William Landes and Judge
Richard Posner developed an influential microeconomic model of
trademark law that retains its currency today.86 In the Landes and
84

Ingram, supra note 55, at 161. By the same token, a lack of policing by the
mark owner can constitute evidence that a mark has become generic. See, e.g.,
Filipino Yellow Pages, 198 F.3d at 1151; King-Seeley, 321 F.2d at 579.
85
Ingram, supra note 55, at 161-62. See also Margulies, supra note 55
(“Coca-Cola engages in several hundred actions year to prevent establishments
from arbitrarily pouring any other cola when the customer asks for a Coke. The
folks at Coke don't want the first half of their name to go the route of the last”).
Evidence was presented in Elliott v. Google that Google also aggressively
threatened dictionaries and others that failed to acknowledge its registration of the
term GOOGLE. Google, 860 F.3d at *19 n.9.
86
Landes & Posner, supra note 57. To be sure, some economic analysis of
trademark law existed prior to Landes and Posner’s work (see, e.g., Folsom &
Tepley, supra note 56, at 1334-46; Lunney, Monopolies, supra note 22, at 367-69
(noting earlier work)), but the work of Landes and Posner is viewed by many as
the landmark work in the field. See, e.g., P. Sean Morris, Trademarks and the
Economic Dimensions of Trademark Law in Europe and Beyond, ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (May 30, 2016), DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-14614-7883-6_566-1 (referring to Landes and Posner’s contribution as a “seminal
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Posner model, the “essential economic function” of trademarks is
the reduction of consumer search costs. 87 For a given product,
consumer search costs associated with a product are inversely
related to the strength of its trademark (the stronger the mark, the
less consumers will have to search) and the number of other words
that producers can use to describe the product (the more words that
are available to describe the product (e.g., computer, electrical,
heavy), the more accurately and economically the producer can
advertise it).88 Because a strong trademark will reduce search costs,
it will enable the producer to raise its price for the product, assuming
that consumers will tolerate the same total cost for a product of a
given quality level (i.e., its monetary price plus the consumer’s
search cost).89
Without protectable trademarks, firms producing lower quality
products could advertise their products using exactly the same
words as firms producing higher quality products, thus misleading
consumers into thinking that the products’ quality levels were
equivalent.90 It follows that the availability of trademarks, which
distinguish one firm’s products from another, encourage firms to
improve their own product quality. 91
If, however, a producer is permitted to appropriate generic terms
that describe a product, then the stock of other words available to
competitors will be reduced, increasing search costs for the
competitors’ products. For example, if Apple could trademark the
generic word “computer”, then other computer makers such as Dell,
Lenovo and HP would be required to find other, less apt, words to
describe their products (e.g., “computation platform” or “artificial
intelligence machine”), thereby adding to consumer uncertainty and,
consequently, increasing the total cost of their products.92 The result
will be a deadweight loss, decreasing overall consumer surplus.
Moreover, the appropriating firm will be able to extract economic
rents, thus disadvantaging its competitors.93 For these reasons, the
appropriation of generic terms as trademarks is viewed as
article which nowadays stands as the cornerstone on the economic analysis of
trademark law”).
87
Landes & Posner, supra note 57, at 275.
88
Id. at 288. This description is necessarily simplified. The Landes-Posner
model takes a number of other variables into account, but these are less relevant
to the current discussion.
89
Id. at 280.
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at 291-92 and Fig. 4 (this effect can be represented by a shift to the left
of the supply curve for the affected competitors).
93
Id.
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economically inefficient and welfare reducing, both as to consumers
and competitors.

II. THE HISTORY OF SUI-GENERICIDE
As discussed in Part I.A above, terms that identify a general
category of goods, rather than the particular source of those goods
(e.g., car, café and computer versus Prius, Starbucks and MacBook),
are generic and cannot be registered or enforced as trademarks. A
finding of genericism is typically made by the PTO during the
examination of an application for trademark registration, or by a
court or the TTAB following a challenge to a mark. Given the large
investments that many firms make in building brand identity and
goodwill, as discussed in Part I.C, trademark owners such as Xerox
often go to great lengths to prevent their marks from becoming
generic. But, surprisingly, some trademark owners have taken a
different approach. These firms have affirmatively stated that
certain terms that might otherwise be protected as trademarks are
generic. As such, they intentionally, and prior to any legal challenge,
seek to relinquish rights in potentially valuable marks, a practice that
I have termed sui-genericide.
Despite the lack of scholarly attention to the phenomenon of
sui-genericide, it is not a new phenomenon. This Part discusses the
largely forgotten history of the sui-genericide programs that arose
during the mid-twentieth century, some of which remain quietly
active today, then addresses an emerging trend in the area of
technical interoperability standards.

A. The Department of Commerce Generic Word Program – A
Genericide Wish List
Beginning in the early 1940s, American businesses started to
become aware that foreign trademark applications were being filed
on terms that were generic in the English language. 94 Many of these
terms described pharmaceutical products and ingredients, including
ANTACID, VITAMIN, ANTI-HISTAMIN, NIACIN, B-COMPLEX, FOLIC
ACID, PENICILLIN and STREPTOMYCIN.95 In 1942, the Proprietary
Association, a trade association for non-prescription drug

94

See James F. Hoge, Protection of Generic and Descriptive Names from
Trade-Mark Registration Abroad, 42 TRADEMARK REP. 514, 514 (1952).
95
Id. at 514-15.

21

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392043

CONTRERAS – SUI-GENERICIDE
manufacturers,96 began to review and oppose these foreign
applications.97 In 1951, the Proprietary Association joined forces
with the American Drug Manufacturers Association and the
American Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association in this
activity.98 By 1952 this coalition had reviewed 253 such foreign
applications in twenty countries and filed 112 oppositions, resulting
in forty-three cancelations and fifteen withdrawals. 99
Beginning sometime in the late 1940s, shortly after the passage
of the Lanham Act, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s Bureau of
Foreign Commerce (later the Bureau of International Commerce)
initiated its own program to oppose foreign trademark applications
seeking to register generic English terms. 100 Though the Bureau’s
“Generic Word Program” initially focused on pharmaceutical terms,
it soon expanded to cover all product categories of interest to
American industry. 101 Under the Program, the Bureau invited
interested U.S. parties to notify it of attempts abroad to register
generic English words as trademarks. The theory underlying the
Program was that if generic English language terms became
trademarks in foreign jurisdictions, U.S. firms would be unable to
use those terms in their foreign advertising, and also that Americanmade products bearing those generic terms could be excluded from
the relevant foreign markets. 102 Thus, in was in the interest of U.S.
firms to self-identify terms that they wished to keep generic, both
abroad and, presumably, at home.
The majority of the notices under the Generic Word Program,
which amounted to over 100 per year by 1965, were submitted to
the Bureau by the U.S. Trademark Association (a trade organization

96

The Proprietary Association was formed in 1881; in 1989 it changed its
name to the Consumer Healthcare Products Association. See Consumer
Healthcare Prods. Assn., About CHPA, https://www.chpa.org/about.aspx (visited
Mar. 27, 2019).
97
Hoge, supra note 94, at 515.
98
Id. at 514.
99
Id. at 515.
100
Walter J. Derenberg, The Third Year of Administration of the Lanham
Trade-Mark Act of 1946, 40 TRADEMARK REP. 914, 946 (1950).
101
For an insider’s description of the Generic Word Program, see, generally,
Vincent D. Travaglini, Industrial Property Rights and Foreign Trade, 51
TRADEMARK REP. 545, 552-54 (1961); Joseph M. Lightman, Protection of
Generic Words against Trademark Registration Abroad, 54 TRADEMARK REP. 80,
80-83 (1964); Vincent D. Travaglini & Joseph M. Lightman, Department of
Commerce Assistance Available to United States Firms in Protection Abroad
against Unfair Trade Practices, 55 TRADEMARK REP. 740, 741-43 (1965).
102
Lightman, supra note 101, at 80.
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now known as the International Trademark Association (INTA)). 103
According to one Bureau official, the program worked as follows:
When the Bureau of International Commerce learns
of a foreign generic word application, it prepares
instructions
containing
appropriate
details
concerning the application, for transmittal to the
American Embassy in the country of application.
The Embassy, in effect, is asked to lodge a protest
with the foreign Government in efforts to have the
application denied. The Embassy is also instructed to
emphasize to Governmental authorities the
detrimental effects which the registration could have
on significant segments of trade between the U. S.
and their country. These Embassy approaches are not
intended to replace the entering of formal
oppositions to objectionable registrations. They
serve as informal representations against the
potentially adverse trade effects of such attempted
registrations. In some countries, the authorities will
deny an application as a result of the Embassy's
approach; in others they have made it clear that a
private formal opposition must be filed before a
denial can be considered. 104
According to two Bureau officials writing in 1965, the Generic
Word Program resulted in the denial of hundreds of foreign
trademark applications “which, if granted, would have prevented
American exporters of the goods concerned from making shipments
to the countries where the applications were filed.” 105 Generic terms
as to which the Bureau successfully objected to foreign registration
include WASH-AND-WEAR, T-SHIRT, ELASTIC, COTTON, SILK, AUTO
PAINT, PRIMER PAINT, AUTO ENAMEL, LACQUER, SATIN, TRACTOR,
DIESEL, AUTO PARTS, OVERDRIVE, CHARCOAL, INTERCOM, RADAR,
SONAR, VIDEO, BEARINGS, CHOCOLATE, SNACK, CRISP, CORN FLAKES,
EGG BACON, OLD FASHIONED, ICE, JELLY-BEANS, MINESTRONE,
BISCUIT, CHEESECAKE, MOZZARELLA and BANANAS.106

103

Travaglini & Lightman, supra note 101, at 742.
Lightman, supra note 101, at 81.
105
Travaglini & Lightman, supra note 101, at 742. The authors further
explain that “[w]hile many such applications may be routinely denied by the local
authorities, experience has shown that some will be accepted unless there is active
intervention to prevent registration.” Id. at 741.
106
Travaglini, supra note 101, at 553-54; Lightman, supra note 101, at 83;
Travaglini & Lightman, supra note 101, at 742-43; In re Le Sorbet, Inc., 228
U.S.P.Q. 27, *4 n.15 (Trademark Tr. & App. Bd. 1985).
104
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The Generic Word Program, which appears to have ended
sometime in the late 1980s,107 represents an important first step
toward sui-genericide. Though the U.S. firms who submitted terms
to the Bureau through USTA did not themselves make any express
representation or commitment regarding the generic nature of those
terms, it is likely that their submission of terms to the Generic Word
Program had the practical effect of an admission of genericness or,
in the alternative, a commitment not to seek registration of the
submitted terms.108
B.

Generic Drug Names

Every drug on the market today generally has three different
names: a chemical name, a generic or nonproprietary name and a
proprietary or brand name. While drug manufacturers seek to
differentiate themselves and enhance their brands via advertising,
packaging and other means, 109 it is important for public health and
safety purposes to have a consistent set of nonproprietary names that
all manufacturers can use to refer to drugs having the same active
ingredients. For example, Advil® and Motrin® are well-known
brands of the same pain medication – ibuprofen -- which bears the
chemical
name
(RS)-2-(4-(2-methylpropyl)phenyl)propanoic
110
acid. The chemical name clearly being too complex for routine
usage, most physicians, pharmacists and consumers will refer to the
drug either by its brand name or, when referring to a class of drugs,
by its generic name.

107
The actual termination date of the Generic Word Program is not clear, but
no references to it have been located after 1985. See Le Sorbet, 228 U.S.P.Q. 27
at *4 n.15; Robert Brauneis & Anke Moerland, Monopolizing Matratzen in
Malaga: The Mistreatment of Distinctiveness of Foreign Terms in EU and US
Trademark Law at MS pp. 7-8 (working draft 2018, copy on file with author)
(estimating end date of program to be in 1980s).
108
See Part IV.D, infra (discussing legal enforceability of submitting firms’
position re. genericism of submitted terms).
109
Proprietary drug names are often created de novo as fanciful terms (e.g.,
Viagra, Lipitor, Tylenol, etc.) and are thus among the strongest trademarks. For a
description of the lengthy and complex process used to select proprietary names
for pharmaceutical products, see, e.g., Pharmacia Corp. v. Alcon Labs., Inc., 201
F. Supp. 2d 335, 340-47 (D.N.J. 2002).
110
See WebMD, Ibuprofen Oral, https://www.webmd.com/drugs/2/drug5166-9368/ibuprofen-oral/ibuprofen-oral/details (visited Mar. 30, 2019).
Chemical names, which are generally of limited commercial value due to their
complexity and unfamiliarity, are assigned by the International Union of Pure and
Applied Chemistry (IUPAC), an international scientific and standardization body
founded in 1919. See Int’l Union of Pure & Applied Chemistry, Who We Are,
https://iupac.org/who-we-are/ (visited Mar. 30, 2019). In addition to chemical
nomenclature, the IUPAC assigns names to newly discovered elements and
develops standardized units of measure, among other things. Id.
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As noted in Part II.A, above, the registration of generic terms by
foreign trademark applicants was first perceived as a threat by the
U.S. pharmaceutical industry in the early 1940s. While the
Proprietary Association’s opposition to the registration of generic
terms such as ANTACID and PENICILLIN helped to limit these foreign
registrations, it soon became clear that individual opposition
proceedings were costly and not always successful.111 Likewise,
diplomatic efforts by the Bureau through the Generic Words
Program could not be relied upon to protect the increasing number
of pharmaceutical compound names employed by the industry. A
more comprehensive solution was required.
The World Health Organization (WHO) was formed in 1946 as
specialized agency of the United Nations. Under the WHO charter,
one of the agency’s goals is “to develop, establish and promote
international standards with respect to food, biological,
pharmaceutical and similar products.” 112 In 1948, the initial World
Health Assembly (the decision-making body of WHO113) resolved
to develop a harmonized international pharmacopeia. 114 Pursuant to
that resolution, the World Health Assembly created a formal
program for selecting international nonproprietary names (INN) for
pharmaceutical compounds.115 Through the INN program, which
was launched in 1953 and continues today, 116 the WHO publishes a
list of pharmaceutical substance names that are intended to be used
generically by the industry. As of 2017, approximately 9,300 terms
have been designated as INNs, with approximately 160 more added
each year.117
Figure 2 below is an example of the entry for a recommended
INN as published by the WHO in its cumulative list of INNs. 118

111
Hoge, supra note 94, at 515 (of 112 oppositions filed between 1942 and
1952, only 43 resulted in cancelation of the targeted application or mark, with
another 15 withdrawals).
112
World Health Org. Constitution Art. 2(u) (1946).
113
See
World
Health
Org.,
World
Health
Assembly,
https://www.who.int/mediacentre/events/governance/wha/en/
114
World Health Org., WHA1.21 (Jul. 1948).
115
World Health Org., WHA3.11 (1950).
116
WORLD HEALTH ORG., GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL
NONPROPRIETARY NAMES (INNS) FOR PHARMACEUTICAL SUBSTANCES 19 (2017)
[hereinafter WHO INN Guidelines].
117
WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at 5.
118
WORLD HEALTH ORG., INTERNATIONAL NONPROPRIETARY NAMES (INN)
FOR PHARMACEUTICAL SUBSTANCES CD-ROM (2017).
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Figure 2
Published INN Entry - paracetamol

Source: WHO INN Guidelines, p. 10

WHO has established detailed rules for the designation of INNs,
including appropriate word stems (e.g., “-aldrate” for antacids and
“-imex” for immunostimulants), number of syllables, use of
hyphens, and the like. 119 Any organization may propose a new INN
to WHO using a standardized application form120 in which the
applicant represents that “insofar as is known, none of the suggested
names is either registered or pending registration” as a trademark121
and discloses any trademark issued for the relevant drug.122
Proposed INNs are reviewed by a WHO expert advisory panel for
compliance with these rules.123 If the proposed INN is deemed
allowable, it is published by WHO for public comment. 124 During
the four-month public comment period, a formal objection may be
119

WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at 11-12 and Annexes 2-4.
World Health Org., Request for an International Nonproprietary Name
(reproduced in WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at Annex 7) [hereinafter
INN Request Form]. See also WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at 14-18
(describing application process).
121
INN Request Form, supra note 120.
122
WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at 16.
123
Id. at 6, 49 (Expert Advisory Panel on the International Pharmacopoeia
and Pharmaceutical Preparations).
124
Id. at 49.
120
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filed by any person (e.g., another manufacturer, a trade association
such as INTA or a government) who believes that the proposed INN
“is in conflict with an existing trademark”. 125 Upon receipt of such
an objection, WHO “will actively pursue an arrangement to obtain
a withdrawal of such an objection or will reconsider the proposed
name.”126 Following the public comment period, once all
outstanding objections have been withdrawn, WHO will publish the
INN in its next semi-annual list of recommended INNs.127
While WHO claims that INNs “are formally placed by WHO in
the public domain,”128 and that “trademarks cannot be derived from
INNs” 129 these claims are somewhat overstated. As a U.N. agency,
with no formal treaty or international agreement in place relating to
INNs, WHO has no formal authority to dictate how national
trademark offices or private parties treat INNs. Thus, in 1993, the
World Health Assembly adopted a resolution requesting WHO
member states “to develop policy guidelines on the use and
protection of international nonproprietary names, and to discourage
the use of names derived from INNs, and particularly names
including established INN stems as trade-marks.”130 To facilitate the
adoption of this recommendation, the WHO produced an
Information Leaflet for Trademark Departments, offering advice
regarding INNs to national trademark offices.131 Thus, while
decisions concerning the registration of INNs remain solely with
national trademark offices and courts, 132 the WHO INN program
serves a valuable function by coordinating industry usage and
promoting norms of genericism with respect to recognized INNs.
The WHO INN process also plays an important role in the
approval of generic drug names in particular countries, including the
125

Id. at 6. See also Lightman, supra note 101, at 84-85 (discussing U.S.
government interaction with INN program).
126
Id. at 6.
127
World Health Org., Lists of Recommended and Proposed INNs,
https://www.who.int/medicines/publications/druginformation/innlists/en/
(visited Mar. 30, 2019).
128
WHO INN Guidelines, supra note 116, at 6.
129
Id. at 7.
130
World Health Org., WHA46.19 (May 1993).
131
World Health Org., Information Leaflet for Trademark Departments
(n.d.), https://www.who.int/medicines/services/inn/flyerINN.pdf?ua=1
132
It is telling that neither the TMEP, supra note 52, nor the FDA’s Best
Practices in Developing Proprietary Names for Drugs (2014) contain any
references to the WHO INN program or terms that are designated as INNs in
describing what terms may and may not be registered as proprietary names for
drugs. See Part IV.B, infra. But while the U.S. may fail to give official recognition
to INNs, other countries have adopted laws and rules prohibiting the registration
of INNs as trademarks. See Part IV.E, infra.
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United States. In the United States, generic drug names are assigned
by the United States Adopted Name Council (USAN Council), a
joint undertaking of the American Medical Association (AMA), the
United States Pharmacopeia (USP), and the American Pharmacists
Association (APhA), cooperating with the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA).133 While many generic drug names were
originally condensed versions of the relevant chemical names, that
is no longer the case. 134 The USAN Council has adopted a detailed
set of guidelines regarding appropriate nomenclature for generic
drug names, including rules for assigning the prefix, infix and stem
(suffix) components of a particular name. 135 These guidelines
specify that “[a] name should not conflict, mislead or be confused
with other nonproprietary names and with established
trademarks.”136 In addition, a generic name prefix should not imply
that a drug is better, newer or more effective than other compounds,
nor should it evoke the name of a manufacturer, medical condition
or part of the human anatomy. 137
The process for creating a new generic drug name is initiated by
a manufacturer who submits an application for the name to the
133
The USAN Council grew out of the AMA-USP Nomenclature Committee,
which has been adopting common drug names since 1961. Joseph B. Jerome,
Review: United States Adopted Names (USAN). Cumulative List No. 1, 19611962, 186 J. AM. MED. ASSN. 1104 (1963). In 1964, the APhA joined this group
to form the USAN Council. 21 C.F.R. 299.4(c) (2014).
134
Am. Med. Assn., United States Adopted Names Naming Guidelines,
https://www.ama-assn.org/about/united-states-adopted-names/united-statesadopted-names-naming-guidelines (visited Mar. 30, 2019) [hereinafter USAN
Naming Guidelines].
135
See USAN Naming Guidelines, supra note 134:

Drugs with the same ending (stem) belong to the same pharmacologic
family. Infixes, appearing in the middle of the word, are sometimes used
to further classify the drug. Prefixes mean nothing. The sole purpose of
a prefix is to differentiate a drug from other members of the class. As an
example, consider sildenafil (Viagra™), vardenafil (Levitra™), and
tadalafil (Cialis™). The -afil stem is formally defined as for PDE5
(phosphodiesterase 5) inhibitors. The -den- infix indicates that sildenafil
and vardenafil have similar chemical structures. The prefixes are sil-,
var- and tadal-.
See also Carmen Drahl, Where Drug Names Come From, 90 CHEMICAL
& ENGINEERING NEWS, Iss. 3, 36 (2012) (explaining idiosyncratic origin
of prefixes for several drugs including dasatinib (named for researcher
Jagabandhu Das), asunaprevir (named for chemist Li-Qiang Sun) and
carfilzomib (named for molecular biologist Philip Whitcome and his
wife, Carla, who both succumbed to cancer).
136
137

USAN Naming Guidelines, supra note 134.
Id.

28

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392043

CONTRERAS – SUI-GENERICIDE
USAN Council. 138 The applicant is required to include with its
application a verification that the proposed generic name does not
conflict with “existing chemical names, insecticides, other
nonproprietary names or trademarks.”139 The application is first
reviewed by USAN staff for potential conflicts with existing
trademarks and other generic names. 140 If no such conflicts are
found, then the USAN Council will review and vote on the approval
of the name. If approved, then USAN will submit the name to WHO
for INN review and a name will not be approved until INN approval
is obtained from WHO.141
Though neither the WHO nor the USAN Council formally
prohibit a party from seeking or obtaining trademark protection for
a term that is designated as an INN or a USAN, or prevent national
trademark offices from issuing such trademarks, the longstanding
and widespread use of these two systems, as well as the FDA’s
endorsement of the USAN in the United States, seem to create a
strong disincentive to the registration of such terms as trademarks.
Moreover, were a rogue party to file a trademark application
covering a USAN or INN, it is likely that, given active monitoring
by trade groups such as INTA and the AMA, the application would
quickly be opposed both by competing manufacturers as well as
trade associations interested in preserving the integrity of the
generic drug naming system. As a result, generic drug names are,
for all practical purposes, generic for trademark purposes as well.
C.

Pesticide Common Names

Like pharmaceutical products, pesticides each have a chemical
name, a common or generic name and, in some cases, a brand or
proprietary name. In the United States, the regulation and oversight
of pest control products and programs was historically shared by a
number of federal agencies including the Public Health Service, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Departments of War and the

138

Am. Med. Assn., USAN Application Forms, https://www.amaassn.org/about/united-states-adopted-names/usan-application-forms (visited Mar.
30, 2019).
139
See, e.g., Am. Med. Assn., Form A - USAN Application for Single Entity
Drug and Salt Form,
140
Am. Med. Assn., USAN Negotiation Process, https://www.amaassn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/public/usan/usanprocess.pdf (visited Mar. 30, 2019).
141
Am. Med. Assn., USAN/INN Negotiation Process, https://www.amaassn.org/sites/ama-assn.org/files/corp/media-browser/usan-inn-negotiationprocess.pdf (visited Mar. 30, 2019).
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Navy.142 Given this diversity of activity, a federal Interdepartmental
Committee on Pest Control was formed in 1946 to help these
agencies to coordinate their activities, research and public
communication.143 Among the Committee’s first activities was “the
adoption of coined names for insecticides” to be used in lieu of the
complex and lengthy chemical names in product labeling and other
communications.144
In 1954, the task of developing these common names for
pesticides was handed off to the American Standards Association
(ASA),145 a private sector body that led U.S. efforts on
standardization in a variety of industrial sectors. 146 A committee
(ASA Committee K-62) was formed that year comprising
representatives of governmental agencies and medical and scientific
societies, under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture.147 Significantly, both the U.S. Patent Office and the
USTA were included as members of Committee K-62.148 The
Committee charter included the development and approval of
common names for herbicides, insecticides, fungicides, rodenticides
and other chemicals. 149 Committee K-62 also coordinated with the
International Standardization Organization (ISO) Technical
Committee 81 (ISO/TC 81), which established international
standards for common names for pesticides and other
agrochemicals.150
In 1956, Committee K-62 approved a procedure for the proposal
and approval of common names for pest control chemicals, which it
published as American Standard K62.1-1956.151 This procedure was
142
See Establishment of an Interdepartmental Committee on Pest Control, 39
J. ECONOMIC ENTOMOLOGY 823, 823 (1946). The large-scale eradication and
control of disease-bearing insects was pioneered by the Army Corps of Engineers
and Public Health Service in the early twentieth century to support U.S. military
activity in tropical locations such as Cuba and Panama. See, e.g., DAVID
MCCULLOCH, THE PATH BETWEEN THE SEAS x (1977).
143
See Establishment of an Interdepartmental Committee on Pest Control, 39
J. ECON. ENTOMOLOGY 823, 823 (1946).
144
See The Interdepartmental Committee on Pest Control, 44 J. ECON.
ENTOMOLOGY 1029, 1029 (1951).
145
George W. Fiero, Report on Program of Common Names for Pesticides,
53 TRADEMARK REP. 553, 553 (1963).
146
See ANDREW L. R USSELL, OPEN STANDARDS AND THE DIGITAL AGE:
HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, AND NETWORKS 63 (2014).
147
Fiero, supra note 145, at 553-54.
148
Id. at 553-54.
149
Id. at 554.
150
Id. at 553.
151
Am. Standards Assn., American Standard K62.1-1956 - American
Standard Procedure for the Acceptance of an American Standard Common Name
for a Pest Control Chemical (Feb. 28, 1956) (reproduced in R. Behrens et al.,
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intended “to make possible the adoption of common names readily
acceptable and usable by all interested groups, while guarding
against confusion with existing common or proprietary names and
against improper use in the future.”152 Under this procedure, new
common names for pesticides would be proposed to ASA by a
sponsor – either the product manufacturer or another organization
having an interest in the product.153 Proposed names had to comply
with a number of technical criteria, 154 but also had to be free of
potential trademark claims. In particular, the sponsor of a proposed
name was required to certify to ASA that
a search has been conducted and findings are
submitted to verify the absence of conflicts with
existing domestic trademarks or names for other
chemicals or products. Should the proposed
Common Name itself be trade-marked or be in
apparent conflict with any domestic trade-mark or
trade name, the Sponsor shall submit to the
Committee a written statement from the trade-mark
owner releasing the proposed Common Name for
unrestricted use.155
The sponsor was thus required to represent not only that it would
not claim trademark rights in an approved common name, but also
that it had searched and determined either that the proposed name
was not subject to competing trademark rights, or that it had
obtained the commitment of the holder of trademark rights
permitting the use of the mark as a common pesticide name. This
procedure indicates a strong interest in trademarks by the industrial
members of Committee K-62, and a strong desire to keep pesticide
common names free from trademark encumbrances.
In 1969 ASA became the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI), which continued the work of Committee K-62 through

Terminology Committee Report: Weed Society of America, 4 W EEDS 278, 284-87
(1956) [hereinafter ASA K62.1-1956].
152
ASA K.62.1-1956, supra note 151, at § 1.1.
153
Id. at § 2.6.
154
Id. at §§ 3.3-3.4.
155
Id. at § 3.5. The form of written statement was included in Section 4.2.11:
“The undersigned agrees to release and permit the use of the name '________' (the
proposed common name) for use with respect to any product, whether or not
manufactured or formulated by the undersigned, which contains a pest control
chemical conforming to the description of the pest control chemical specified by
ASA in an American Standard adopted and made public pursuant to this
Statement.” See also Fiero, supra note 145, at 557-59 (sample application with
trademark disclosures).
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approximately 1997.156 In 1997, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), whose regulations require that the “accepted
common name” of a pesticide be displayed on the product label, 157
expressly deferred to ANSI’s Committee K-56 for purposes of
determining pesticide common names. 158
After 1997, however, possibly due to declining funding and
interest by the committee’s sponsor, the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, ANSI discontinued both Committee K-62 and its
participation in ISO/TC 81. The last version of ANSI’s K.62.1
naming procedure was published in 1985 and withdrawn by ANSI
as inactive in 2001.159
Today, pesticide common names are developed and maintained
largely by ISO/TC 81, which has nine participating members and 32
observing members (none of which are from the U.S.).160 ISO
standard 257:2018 (originally published in 1976) lays out guidelines
for the development of common names for pesticides and other
agrochemicals, with the goal of creating “short, distinctive, easily
pronounced names, which will be common to all languages.”161 As
in the defunct ANSI procedure, common pesticide names are
generally proposed by private companies with an interest in the field
and then reviewed by ISO TC/81.
D.

Synthetic Textile Fibers

In the mid-twentieth century, mass-produced synthetic fibers
such as nylon and polyester began to replace natural fibers such as
wool and cotton in clothing, linens and a variety of other consumer
156

A search of the web store of the commercial standards vendor SAI Global
(infostore.saiglobal.com) for the term ANSI K.62.1 yields 102 standards, each of
which was last updated in 1997 (search conducted Apr. 1, 2019).
157
40 CFR 156.10(g).
158
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, PRN 97-5: Use of Common
Names for Active Ingredients on Pesticide Labeling, § IV.C
https://www.epa.gov/pesticide-registration/prn-97-5-use-common-names-activeingredients-pesticide-labeling “EPA prefers that common names for chemicals be
established through standards-setting organizations such as ANSI.”)
159
Information provided to author by ANSI Web Store supervisor via
telephone (212-642-4980) on Apr. 1, 2019.
160
Int’l
Standardization
Org.,
ISO/TC
81,
https://www.iso.org/committee/50160.html (visited Apr. 1, 2019). Interestingly,
the EPA still refers to ANSI’s development of pesticide common names in
materials as recent as 2012. See, e.g., Envt’l Prot. Agency, Label Review Manual
at p. 5-3 (2012) (“EPA will permit the use of common names approved by the
American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in the labeling ingredients
statement without the accompanying scientific chemical names”).
161
Int’l Standardization Org., ISO 257:2018, Introduction.
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products.162 Under the 1958 Textile Fiber Products Identification
Act,163 manufacturers are required to affix to every textile fiber
product a stamp, tag or label that discloses the fiber content, by
weight, of each textile product with reference to that fiber’s generic
name.164 Civil and criminal penalties may be imposed with respect
to the sale or advertising of textile fiber products that are
“misbranded or falsely or deceptively advertised”. 165
Authority for assigning appropriate generic names to different
synthetic fibers under the Act resides with the FTC.166 When
developing its initial list of sixteen generic names for common
synthetic fibers, including acrylic, acetate, polyester and nylon, the
FTC held extensive consultations with representatives of private
industry regarding the parameters for developing such generic
terms.167 It was decided that such generic terms would be defined
based on a fiber’s chemical composition. For example, “acetate” is
defined as “a manufactured fiber in which the fiber-forming
substance is cellulose acetate...”168 whereas other definitions are
significantly more complex and include detailed chemical diagrams
and formulae.169
Since 1977, the FTC has stopped developing its own fiber names
and has instead adopted the names designated by the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) in ISO standard 2076.170
This standard is maintained and reviewed every five years by ISO

162
See A.F. Richards, Nylon Fibres in SYNTHETIC FIBRES : NYLON,
POLYESTER, ACRYLIC, POLYOLEFIN 20, 20-21 (J.E. McIntyre, ed., 2005).
Synthetic fibers are generally understood to be “manufactured from polymers
built up from chemical elements or compounds” and to exclude fibers made from
naturally-occurring fiber-forming polymers such as rayon, which is made from
regenerated cellulose, which was introduced to the market much earlier. Id. at 1.
163
P.L. 85-897, 72 Stat. 1712 (Sept. 2, 1958, codified at 15 USC § 70 et seq.).
The Textile Fiber Products Identification Act followed the pattern of earlier
chapters of the FTC’s authorizing legislation relating, for example, to the sale and
advertising of natural fiber products such as wool (15 USC § 68 et seq.) and fur
(15 USC § 69 et seq.). See also 16 CFR Part 303 (Rules and Regulations Under
The Textile Fiber Products Identification Act).
164
15 USC § 70b(b).
165
15 USC § 70a(a)-(c) (establishing liability), § 70f (injunction
proceedings), § 70g (exclusion of imports), § 70i (criminal misdemeanor
penalties).
166
15 USC § 70e(c).
167
See Lightman, supra note 101, at 83.
168
16 CFR Part 303.7(e).
169
See, e.g., 16 CFR Part 303.7(c) (polyester).
170
See 16 CFR Part 303.7 (incorporating ISO standard ISO 2076:2010(E) by
reference).
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Technical Committee 38 (ISO/TC 38 – Textiles).171 ISO/TC 38
currently has twenty-nine participating members including the
United States, represented by ANSI, and forty-six observing
members.172
In a manner similar to the Generic Word Program, the FTC has
coordinated with the Department of State and U.S. embassies abroad
to request (with some measure of success) that foreign governments
prohibit the registration of these synthetic fiber names as
trademarks.173 Thus, the FTC, in its capacity as the overseer of fair
advertising in the U.S., has taken an active role in ensuring the
recognition of these fiber names as generic terms. Yet even here, the
generic terms for synthetic fibers originate with industry players
who then participate in a process overseen by the FTC.
E.

Government Engagement With Sui-Genericide Today

By the late 1970s, U.S. federal agencies became increasingly
hesitant to involve themselves directly in industrial standardization
activities, culminating in the adoption, in 1980, of OMB Circular A119, which expressly instructs federal agencies to defer to private
standardization efforts absent a compelling need for
governmentally-developed standards. 174 As a result, efforts such as
the Generic Word Program and other direct federal participation in
the development of common names for U.S.-manufactured products
wound down by the mid-1980s.
This being said, the U.S. government is still actively involved in
some aspects of common names. Thus, while the naming of generic
drugs has largely been assumed in the U.S. by the private USAN
Council in coordination with WHO, the FDA has taken an active

Int’l Org. Standardization, ISO 2076:2013 (Textiles -- Man-made fibres -Generic names), https://www.iso.org/standard/56206.html (visited Mar. 31,
2019). It appears that through the most recent revision in 2013, the 1977 list has
been retained. Id.
172
Int’l Org. Standardization, Participation – ISO/TC 38 – Textiles,
https://www.iso.org/committee/48148.html?view=participation (visited Mar. 31,
2019).
173
See Lightman, supra note 101, at 83. Interestingly, one Department of
Commerce official reports that at the beginning of the program, “some of these
words had been registered abroad by American companies prior to their …
designation by the Federal Trade Commission. In these cases, the Commission
worked out appropriate arrangements with the U. S. companies not to exercise
any restrictive rights on sales abroad of goods bearing these terms.” Lightman,
supra note 101, at 84.
174
Off. Mgt. Budget, Circular A-119: [cite]. See, generally, Emily Bremer
[2019 chapter].
171
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role in seeking to develop guidelines for the development of
common names for new biological products. 175
In addition, though the Department of Commerce Bureau of
Foreign Commerce (and successor Bureau of International
Commerce) no longer exist to discourage foreign trademark offices
from registering generic English terms through the Generic Word
Program, the USPTO advocates to “improve IP policies, laws, and
regulations abroad for the benefit of U.S. businesses and
stakeholders” through its IP Attaché Program. 176 Likewise, the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) identifies foreign IP practices that are
of concern to U.S. industry and seeks to “use all possible sources of
leverage to encourage other countries to … provide adequate and
effective protection and enforcement of U.S. intellectual property
(IP) rights.”177
With respect to generic terms, the USTR has actively opposed
the protection of geographic indications (GIs) by the European
Union when those GIs are viewed as common names for foodstuffs
exported by U.S. manufacturers. 178 For example, the USTR opposed
the EU’s designation of “danbo” as a geographic indication for a
type of cheese made in Denmark (pursuant to which only producers
located in the Danbo region could use that term to describe their
cheese products), as manufacturers in the U.S. and elsewhere use
“danbo” as the common name for this variety of cheese. 179 Similar
concerns have been expressed with respect to other cheese varieties
such as fontina, gongonzola, asiago and feta, as well as nonagricultural products including including apparel, ceramics, glass,
handicrafts, manufactured goods, minerals, salts, stones, and
textiles.180 And far from being only a bilateral U.S.-EU issue,
See U.S. DEPT. HEALTH AND HUMAN SVCS. – FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
NONPROPRIETARY NAMING OF BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS: UPDATE GUIDANCE FOR
INDUSTRY – DRAFT GUIDANCE (Mar. 2019).
176
U.S. Patent & Trademark Off., IP Attaché Program,
https://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/ip-policy/intellectual-propertyrights-ipr-attach-program/intellectual?MURL=ipattache (visited Apr. 29, 2019).
177
OFF. OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2019 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 5 (Apr. 2019)
[hereinafter Special 301 Report].
178
Id. at 20. Common names for food products are designated by the Codex
Alimentarius Commission, a collaboration of the WHO and the UN Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO). See FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG. OF THE U.N.
AND WORLD HEALTH ORG., UNDERSTANDING THE CODEX ALIMENTARIUS 17
(2016).
179
Special 301 Report, supra note 177, at 20. See also Consortium for
Common Food Names, EU Turns its Back on Codex Cheese Standards by
Approving
GI
for
Generic
Name,
Dec.
1,
2017,
http://www.commonfoodnames.com/eu-turns-its-back-on-codex-cheesestandards-by-approving-gi-for-generic-name/ (visited Apr. 29, 2019).
180
Special 301 Report, supra note 177, at 20.
175
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international disputes regarding the treatment of generic and
common names have arisen with numerous countries. 181
F.

Technical Standards

A somewhat different recent example of sui-genericide has
arisen in the context of technical interoperability standards –
protocols like Wi-Fi, Bluetooth and 4G/5G that enable different
manufacturers’ products to communicate with each other. In most
cases, these standards are developed within trade associations
known as standards-development organizations (SDOs), which
include ISO (mentioned above), the European Telecommunications
Standards Institute (ETSI) and the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA).182 Private
firms make technical contributions to standards within these SDOs
and, once draft standards are advanced to a level suitable for
implementation in products, vote to approve and publish standards
through the SDO.183
1.

Trademarks and Technical Standards184

Though standards largely play a technical role and are
implemented in products that are manufactured and sold not by the
SDO, but by firms that may or may not be SDO members, the names
of standards (referred to here as standard-names) can play an
important role in the market for technology products of all kinds.

181
See, e.g., Special 301 Report, supra note 177, at 30 and 81 (Costa Rica)
and 48 (China).
182
See, generally, Brad Biddle, No Standard for Standards: Understanding
the ICT Standards-Development Ecosystem, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF
TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS,
Ch. 2 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2018) (describing the broad range of SDOs active
in technology markets).
183
Id.
184
Trademarks relating to technical standards have received relatively scant
attention in the literature compared to patents and copyrights. For an overview of
the use of trademarks with technical standards, see Jorge L. Contreras,
Trademarks, Certification Marks and Technical Standards in C AMBRIDGE
HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW: FURTHER INTERSECTIONS
OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LAW, Chapter X (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2019). In
contrast, there is an extensive literature relating to copyrights and patents covering
technical standards, including requirements to license those patents on terms that
are “fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory” (FRAND), see Jorge L. Contreras,
Technical Standards, Standards-Setting Organizations and Intellectual Property:
A Survey of the Literature (With an Emphasis on Empirical Approaches), in
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW,
VOL. II – ANALYTICAL METHODS (Peter S. Menell & David Schwartz, eds., 2019,
forthcoming) (review of literature).
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When a consumer shops for a new smartphone, she
will likely check whether different models
implement a range of common standards such as WiFi, Bluetooth, and 4G (soon 5G). Likewise, the
typical consumer knows that when she switches from
a phone that is charged using a microUSB connector
to one that uses Apple’s “Lightning” connector or the
more recent USB-C connector, she will need to
replace her charging cables as well. Most consumers
have only the vaguest notion of how the standards
behind these technologies work. Nevertheless,
consumers are familiar with the functionality
associated with these simple trade names. The names
of technical standards thus fulfill a critical
informational role for consumers. 185
SDOs have taken a variety of approaches to protecting standardnames. Most prohibit or discourage the use of existing trademarks
in standard-names unless they are used in a descriptive sense (e.g.,
Protocol for Gizmo Compatibility with Microsoft Windows®).186
But aside from this general principle, SDOs vary significantly in the
ways that they treat their standard-names. Many standard names are
simply descriptive terms (e.g., ISO’s well-known ISO 9001:2015
standard titled “Quality Management Systems – Requirements”) or
acronyms for descriptive terms (e.g., HDMI, an acronym for High
Definition Multimedia Interface). 187 These acronyms are generally
not registered or protected as trademarks. Some SDOs (e.g., the
Internet Engineering Task Force) have registered trademarks in their
organization names (e.g., IETF®), but do not protect the names of
their standards at all. 188 Other SDOs (e.g., the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI)) have registered
and maintained trademarks for their standard-names and license
these marks for use by manufacturers of standards-compliant
products, typically on a broad, royalty-free basis.189
2.

Standards and Certification

Some SDOs, rather than protecting their standard-names as
trademarks, have instead registered them as certification marks. 190
Bluetooth, for example, is a popular short-range wireless
185

Contreras, Trademarks, supra note 184, at x.
See id. at *21-22.
187
[cite web sites].
188
See Contreras, Trademarks, supra note 184, at x.
189
See id. at *24-25.
190
See id. at *21, Table 2.
186
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connectivity standard published by the Bluetooth Special Interest
Group and is registered as a certification mark.191 Likewise, WI-FI
(designating the 802.11 series of wireless networking standards
published by IEEE) is a certification mark held by the Wi-Fi
Alliance.192 Unlike trademarks, certification marks are intended to
identify not the source of a product, but particular characteristics of
a product.193
Many different characteristics are represented by certifications,
including conformity to specified safety requirements, reliability
measures, manufacturing processes, sourcing practices and
purity/ingredient specifications. In many cases, these certifications
provide consumers with information that would not easily be
discernable from an outward inspection of the product. For
example, consumers looking for “organic” bananas or a kosher
delicatessen are likely to rely upon certifications that particular
bananas or delis meet these criteria, it being difficult, if not
impossible, to verify these facts independently. 194 So long as the
certification is issued by a trusted intermediary, then consumers
have good cause to believe that the certification signifies genuine
compliance with the relevant standard. Certification also provides
consumers (and retailers) with assurances regarding the safety of
certain types of products (whether electrical equipment or raw
vegetables). Seeing a UL certification on an electrical appliance or
a USDA seal of approval on a package of fresh produce generally
signifies that the product will conform to accepted minimum safety
requirements.195 Such certifications are today a market necessity for
many product categories, and are used by several SDOs to signify
compliance with their standards. 196
3.

Acts of Sui-Genericide: USB and W3C

The USB Implementers Forum, Inc. (USB-IF) is a non-profit
corporation formed in 1995 by the companies that developed the
191

Mark no.
Mark no.
193
See, generally, JEFFREY BELSON, CERTIFICATION AND C OLLECTIVE
MARKS (2017); Margaret Chon Certification and Collective Marks in the United
States in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
TRADEMARK LAW (Jane Ginsburg & Irene Calboli, eds., 2019).
194
See Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 101, xx
(2009); Jeanne Fromer, The Unregulated Certification Mark(et), 69 STAN. L.
REV. 121, xx (2017).
195
See, generally, Fromer, supra note 194, at x.
196
See Board-Tech Electronic Co. v. Eaton Corporation, Cooper Wiring
Devices, Inc., 2018 WL 2901336, No. 17-3829-cv at *1 (2d Cir. Jun. 11, 2018)
(“to be commercially viable, light switches in the United States must undergo
certification by Underwriters Laboratories”).
192
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Uniform Serial Bus (USB) standard. 197 USB-IF, which today has
over one thousand member companies, supports the advancement
and adoption of USB technology. 198 USB-IF owns several
trademarks and certification marks relating to the Uniform Serial
Bus (USB) standard for interconnecting and charging electronic
devices (e.g., CERTIFIED USB199). Yet USB-IF does not hold a
registration for the term USB itself. While USB, as an acronym for
a relatively well-known descriptive term (Uniform Serial Bus),
would likely be deemed descriptive under the Abercrombie
framework,200 it is possible that the mark USB, which has been in
use for more than twenty years, has developed secondary meaning
and has thus acquired distinctiveness. As such, it is not a term
without potential value.
Nevertheless, USB-IF has publicly declared that the term
USB is generic. For example, in a 2008 opposition proceeding
before the TTAB, USB-IF opposed a third party’s attempted
registration of the mark USB-HOUSE (which lacked any disclaimer as
to the term USB) on the ground that the term USB is generic. 201 In
the proceeding, the President and Chairman of USB-IF submitted a
declaration stating that the term USB “is the common generic term
used to describe a computer port that can be used to connect
keyboards, mice, game controllers, printers, scanners, digital
cameras, and removable media drives.”202 USB-IF also noted that
there were more than eighty records in the USPTO’s trademark
database containing the term USB (e.g., USB NOW, USB REALTIME,
FLEXIUSB, etc.), all of which contained a disclaimer of the term USB
standing alone. USB-IF succeeded in having the registration for
USB-HOUSE denied.
Even more notable is the practice of the Worldwide Web
Consortium (W3C). W3C is the primary standardization body for
the Worldwide Web and is responsible for fundamental Internet
application layer protocols including Worldwide Web (www),
Hypertext Markup Language (HTML), and Extensible Markup
197
USB
Implementers
Forum,
Inc.,
About
USB-IF,
https://www.usb.org/about (visited Apr. 28, 2019).
198
USB Implementers Forum, Inc., Members, https://www.usb.org/members
(visited Apr. 28, 2019).
199
U.S. Trademark No. 2,592,682 (Jul. 9, 2002).
200
Acronyms for descriptive terms are generally deemed to be descriptive
themselves. See Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1209.03(h) (“As a
general rule, an acronym or initialism cannot be considered descriptive unless the
wording it stands for is merely descriptive of the goods or services, and the
acronym or initialism is readily understood by relevant purchasers to be
‘substantially synonymous’ with the merely descriptive wording it represents”).
201
In re. USB-HOUSE (2008).
202
Id. at Ex. C.
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Language (XML). 203 W3C is an unincorporated coalition of four
educational institutions: the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT), the European Research Consortium for Informatics and
Mathematics (ECRIM), Keio University and Beihang University. 204
Its membership consists of approximately 450 institutions, private
firms and other organizations having an interest in standards for the
Worldwide Web.205
The acronym W3C is a registered trademark in a number of
jurisdictions.206 W3C also holds registered and unregistered
trademarks in a number of project names including P3P (the
Platform for Privacy Preferences Project) and the Amaya web
browser/editor.207 Yet on its web site, W3C expressly identifies
twenty additional terms (including the widely-deployed HTML,
XML and HTTP standards)208 that it expressly designates as
generic.209 W3C states that “Terms which claimed as generic are not
governed by any W3C license and are used as common descriptors
by the W3C.”210
What do USB and W3C hope to achieve through these public
statements that, if anything, appear to diminish their ability to
control the use of their own marks? The next Part examines the
potential rationales and effects of such declarations of suigenericide.

203

[cite W3C web site info].
W3C, Facts About W3C, https://www.w3.org/Consortium/facts#org
(visited Apr. 28, 2019).
205
W3C, Current Members, https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Member/List
(visited Apr. 28, 2019) (listing 448 members).
206
Because W3C is not an incorporated entity, its intellectual property,
including trademarks, is held by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, its
host institution. See Jorge L. Contreras, A Tale of Two Layers: Patents,
Standardization and the Internet, 93 DENVER L. REV. 85, xx (2016) (describing
W3C legal structure).
207
Worldwide Web Consortium (W3C), W3C Trademarks and Generic
Terms,
https://www.w3.org/Consortium/Legal/2002/trademarks-20021231
(2019) (visited Apr. 28, 2019) [hereinafter W3C Trademark Page].
208
Id. HTML is an acronym for “hypertext markup language”, XML is an
acronym for “extensible markup language” and HTTP is an acronym for
“hypertext transmission protocol”.
209
W3C Trademark Page, supra note 207 (designating the following terms
as generic: ACSS, CSS, DOM, DSig, HTML, HTTP, JEP, MathML, Metadata,
PICS, PICSRules, RDF, SMIL, SVG, WebFonts, XENC, XHTML, XML,
XMLDSIG and XSL).
210
W3C Trademark Page, supra note 207.
204
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III. UNDERSTANDING SUI-GENERICIDE
As described in Part II, sui-genericide – the voluntary
declaration of potentially valuable terms as generic – has been
observed in a range of contexts from common names for pesticides
and synthetic fibers to broadly adopted technical standards. This
Part explores the rationales leading private firms to relinquish rights
to these potentially valuable terms, and how sui-genericide
compares to other mechanisms that allow the broad usage of
common terms.
A. Market Rationales for Sui-Genericide
After World War II, the growth of American manufacturing
industries led to the emergence of markets for novel products. Thus,
unlike wool and cotton which had existed for centuries, new
synthetic fibers like nylon and polyester were being invented and
sold to the public. At the same time, governmental regulators like
the FTC began to impose disclosure and labeling requirements to
safeguard public health and safety and to inform consumers about
the content of products they were buying.
Thus, manufacturers, regulators and consumers were united in
their desire to find new generic terms to refer to the basic categories
of new products entering the market. The broad recognition of these
generic terms would accomplish three interrelated purposes for
manufacturers: (1) giving them a common lexicon with which to
describe the complex characteristics of their products (e.g., chemical
composition and functional effect), (2) enabling them to build brand
recognition and loyalty through proprietary names that would thus
be less likely to fall to genericide challenges, and (3) preventing
others from capturing generic terms used to describe their product
categories. By the same token, allowing a particular manufacturer to
capture the generic term for a product would not only harm
competitors, but make it more difficult for regulators to convey
important safety information to the public, and for consumers to
understand the features of the products they were purchasing. 211
For example, suppose that the name NYLON were registered as a
trademark by a particular manufacturer. Other manufacturers
wishing to describe the fiber content of their products could not use
the term NYLON unless they wished to refer to fiber produced by the
owner of the mark. As a result, they would be forced to describe
their nylon-containing products using the much more cumbersome
211

See Landes-Posner model, discussed in Part x, supra.
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chemical names for the fiber, such as polyhexamethylene
adipamide, polycaproamide or polyundecanamide. 212 The use of
these complex chemical names would not only disadvantage
competing nylon manufacturers, but would also be less informative
to consumers, who would be less likely to remember the
characteristics of the fiber when identified by such a complex name.
Accordingly, the government took an active hand in organizing
early naming efforts in fields such as prescription drugs, pesticides
and synthetic fibers. The centralized organizational frameworks and
rule structures used to develop these names were familiar to
scientists and technicians from a range of disciplines, as they
resembled much older organizational structures that had been in
place since at least the eighteenth century to assign widely-accepted
common names to newly discovered astronomical bodies, 213
chemical elements, 214 and plant and animal species. 215 The
difference, of course, between these older naming systems and
product generic names is that a new heavenly body or species of
bacteria will seldom have significant commercial value, whereas a
new prescription medication or clothing fiber could have substantial
value. Private industry thus took a leading role in developing and
approving common names for new product categories and, as
described in Part II, eventually took over this role entirely from the
government.
Outwardly, the designation by SDOs of certain standard-names
as generic resembles the coordinated sui-genericide activities by
participants in industries like pharmaceuticals and pesticides. SDOs
are, after all, trade associations comprising industry participants
interested in particular technologies who coordinate to develop
technical standards for use by all product manufacturers. If the
principal developers of USB technology agree to treat the term USB
as generic, free from trademark appropriation, then the term could
be used freely by all manufacturers of computer peripherals and
devices implementing the USB standard. The manufacturers could
then differentiate their own product offerings using proprietary
brand marks (e.g., the Rosewill® USB 7-port Hub or the SanDisk
Cruzer USB 2.0 Flash Drive).
212

See ISO 2076-1977 (E) at 4 (definition of nylon).
Astronomical bodies are named by the International Astronomical Union.
See Intl. Astronomical Un., Naming of Astronomical Objects,
https://www.iau.org/public/themes/naming/.
214
See International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry, Periodic Table of
Elements, https://iupac.org/what-we-do/periodic-table-of-elements/#a4 (visited
Apr. 29, 2019).
215
See, e.g., MICHAEL OHL, THE ART OF NAMING (English trans. Elisabeth
Lauffer, 2018).
213
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In fact, the case for sui-genericide of technical standard-names
may be even more clear than it is in other markets. While SDOs
create and publish standards that are embodied in a wide range of
products – smartphones, cars, telecommunications satellites – SDOs
neither manufacture these products nor any components included in
them. Instead, they publish documents laying out the protocols
necessary to make these products interoperate with one another.
Thus, ETSI has published numerous versions of the fourth
generation (4G) long term evolution (LTE) standard for wideband
wireless communication, and holds trademark registrations for LTE
in various countries. However, ETSI itself does not manufacture or
sell LTE-compliant products. Smartphones that can connect to the
LTE network are manufactured by firms like Apple, Samsung, and
many others, each of which is licensed by ETSI to utilize the LTE
mark on its LTE-compliant products. And the microchips that
enable LTE functionality in these smartphones are sold by vendors
like Qualcomm. So if a trademark is intended to indicate source,
what source is being indicated by Samsung’s use of the LTE mark
to indicate that its smartphones contain Qualcomm chips that
contain LTE technology? Certainly, use of the LTE mark says
nothing about the source or quality of the smartphone, except that it
presumably conforms to ETSI’s LTE standard. 216 Thus, the value of
trademarks on standard-names is questionable.
B.

Doctrinal Effects of Genericide

If a term is generic, it describes a product characteristic without
indicating its source. A zipper, an escalator, a cellophane wrapper
– all of these products and product features may be described by
anyone making a product with the relevant characteristics. So, just
as an apparel maker may claim that “This travel vest has five
zippered pockets”, a product manufacturer may claim “This laptop
offers four USB ports”. To make this claim, the statement should
be true, but the manufacturer need not obtain the permission of the
owner of a particular mark or pass any particular certification test.

216

Ultimately, the reason that SDOs register standard-names as trademarks
may trace its roots to the standards documents themselves. In many respects,
SDOs act like publishers: they sell (or sometimes make freely available) copies
of their standards. And, like publishers of books, music and other copyrighted
content, piracy of standards documents is a real concern for many SDOs (see
Contreras, Trademarks, supra note x, at *16-17, 21 (discussing piracy and
protection of copyrighted standards). Thus, SDOs that anticipate the need to assert
rights against unauthorized publishers of their standards may find the registration
of trademarks to be helpful in enforcing such rights.
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The manufacturer may simply assert, on a factual basis, that the
relevant feature is offered. 217
The genericness of a term also precludes others from registering
it as a mark, and poses obstacles to registering it as part of a mark
without disclaiming the generic term. Thus, as discussed above, 218
USB-IF successfully challenged an applicant’s application for the
mark USB-HOUSE when the term USB itself was not disclaimed. But
this result required both that USB-IF monitor and become aware of
the threatened registration, and that it then intervene at the TTAB,
neither of which is cost-free. Yet even this option does not prevent
the use of the generic term in marks, it only prevents the registrant
from claiming rights in the generic term used independently. Thus,
as USB-IF noted in the USB-HOUSE dispute, there are more than 80
registered marks that incorporate the generic term USB.219
These results suggest that generic terms can be incorporated
more freely than trademarks into combination marks, either with or
without disclaimers. The diversity of names and terms that emerge
can be viewed as a positive effect: an opening, as it were, in an
otherwise narrowing trademark universe; a growth of the trademark
commons. This proliferation of marks might not be possible save for
the genericness of the underlying mark. And the desire for private
actors such as W3C and USB-IF to open the market to broader uses
of these otherwise protectable terms can be analogized to similar
gestures toward the public domain made by firms with respect to
patentable technologies and copyrighted works. 220
These principles are consistent with the economic model
developed by Landes and Posner. In order to maximize consumer
surplus, generic terms must remain available to all competitors to
describe general categories of goods and services, which can then
be differentiated on the basis of individual firm branding. But the
classification of terms as generic, and thus beyond the scope of
trademark protection, cannot be unbounded. As Landes and Posner
show, trademarks themselves provide value to consumers in terms
of reduced search costs. Thus, maximizing consumer surplus
involves both the recognition of non-generic terms as trademarks,
and the availability of generic terms to describe general categories
of goods and services.
217
The same result obtains under a nominative fair use analysis, but the use
of a generic term avoids the necessity to contend with the still-unclear standards
for nominative fair use in the U.S.
218
See notes x, supra, and accompanying text.
219
List examples
220
See notes x, supra, and accompanying text.
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Thus, to the party that wishes to expand the universe of terms
that may be used in commerce, a determination that a mark is
generic offers advantages over simply declining to register a mark
in the first place. Non-registration leaves the potentially generic
term open to registration and enforcement by others, a risky
proposition. The finding that a mark is generic, on the other hand,
has erga omnes effect – one that impacts all possible registrants and
users of the mark. As such, like defensive publication in the patent
realm,221 genericide does more than eliminate the first user’s ability
to exploit a term. It returns the term to the public.
C.

Certification versus Genericide

But what about certification marks? As discussed in Part x
above, the owner of a certification mark may specify relevant
quality or functionality features of a product (e.g., organic, kosher),
so that that the manufacturer of any compliant product may
designate its product using the mark. Use of a certification mark
thus informs consumers that the marked product conforms with the
relevant certification standards, and also allows different
manufacturers to compete on the basis of price, size and other
product features (e.g., Chiquita versus Dole organic bananas). An
additional benefit to consumers is that the owner of the certification
mark must make some effort to police the use of its certification
mark, thus establishing at least some baseline for reliance on the
mark.
But are the same guarantees regarding product characteristics
and safety required for the types of products that have been subject
to sui-genericide declarations? As discussed in Part II, the
manufacture and marketing of pharmaceuticals, pesticides and
synthetic fibers are all regulated by governmental agencies. This
regulation, coupled with a range of private remedies for false
advertising, misrepresentation and consumer fraud, may give
consumers the assurances that they need regarding the accuracy of
product labeling, and thus reducing the need for separate
certification through trademark law. For example, suppose that a
firm marketed a product labeled as containing ibuprofen, but its
active ingredient did not conform to the WHO’s INN definition of
ibuprofen. This act – whether arising from negligence or deception
-- would subject the firm to a barrage of liability claims, from FDA
enforcement actions to consumer and competitor lawsuits for false
advertising to tort claims for any resulting injuries or health effects.
221

See note x, supra.
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It is unlikely that a certification mark for IBUPROFEN, whether held
by a trade association or another private firm, would appreciably
increase the incentives to label a product accurately as containing
ibuprofen.
The need for certification appears equally uncertain in the area
of technical standards. Certainly, compliance with key
interoperability standards is an important feature of many products.
When a computer is advertised as including Bluetooth capability, a
consumer is justified in relying on that representation in making a
purchasing decision. In this sense, one might argue that having an
independent certification that a laptop incorporates Bluetooth
technology is useful to consumers. Yet a laptop computer embodies
hundreds of standards 222 and thousands of features and
functionalities in addition to interoperability standards. If these
features do not work as promised, it is not difficult to construct a
theory under which the consumer should be entitled to recover (e.g.,
breach of implied warranty, false advertising, etc.). Moreover, every
consumer need not test a product’s features for himself or herself.
Once a product is found not to conform to its advertised features,
online reviews, retailer pressure, consumer protection regulators and
consumer litigation may all combine to push manufacturers to label
product features accurately. In these cases, independent certification
also adds little to manufacturer incentives to advertise product
features accurately.
Thus, certification and certification marks may not be all that
necessary in product categories that are either heavily regulated or
in which the presence or absence of a product’s advertised features
is discernable by consumers or consumer protection groups.
Whether the product is ibuprofen or nylon or a USB device, the user
of the term has a duty to represent its product fairly and accurately.
If it does not, then a range of regulatory and tort remedies are
available.
And another implicit function of certification marks –
precluding a third party from obtaining trademark protection on the
same mark – can more easily and cost-effectively be achieved
through sui-genericide. That is, a declaration of sui-genericide does
not require the operation of a certification program or even the
registration and maintenance of certification marks. Sui-genericide
may thus function like a poor man’s certification. It enables the
222

See Brad Biddle, Andrew White & Sean Woods, How Many Standards in
a Laptop? (And Other Empirical Questions), 2010 INT’L TELECOMM. UNION SEC.
TELECOMM. STANDARDIZATION, KALEIDOSCOPE ACAD. CONF. PROC. at 3 (finding
251 standards embodied in an out-of-the-box laptop computer).
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name of a common product feature or characteristic to be used
broadly within the marketplace, without the cost or legal overhead
of certification.
D.

Sui-Genericide versus Nominative Fair Use

Under the nominative fair use doctrine, as it has developed in
the U.S. and elsewhere, a third party may use and display another’s
trademark in a manner that is non-deceptive and that does not imply
endorsement by the mark owner when referring to the products or
services of the mark owner. 223 Thus, an automotive repair shop may
use the trademarked word VOLKSWAGEN to advertise that it repairs
Volkswagen automobiles, so long as it does not imply that it has
been endorsed by Volkswagen and uses only so much of the mark
as is necessary to convey the relevant information.224
One could thus argue that sui-genericide is not necessary, as the
broad use of terms like ibuprofen and USB on products with relevant
features, even if these terms were owned as trademarks, could be
permitted as nominative fair use. But one must then pose the
converse question: why expend the resources required to register
and maintain a trademark when its primary purpose will be to be
used on products manufactured by others under the nominative fair
use doctrine. Sui-genericide offers an inexpensive and effective
means to achieve a result similar to that achieved through trademark
protection coupled with nominative fair use.

IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORKS FOR SUI-GENERICIDE
If benefits can flow from recognition of marks as generic, then
it is worth considering whether and how the practice of suigenericide could be formalized and made available to parties that
would like to avail themselves of it. This Part first assesses the legal
effect of sui-genericide statements, and then assesses potential legal
frameworks that could enhance the enforceability of these
commitments.

223

See J. Thomas McCarthy, MCC ARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 23:11 (4th ed. 2008); William McGeveran, Rethinking
Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L. REV. 49 (2008).
224
See Volkswagen v. Church (9th Cir. 1969) (“[In] advertising the repair of
Volkswagens, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to avoid altogether the use
of the word Volkswagen or its abbreviation ‘VW’, which are the normal terms
which, to the public at large, signify [the mark owner’s] cars.”)
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A. Legal Effect of Unilateral Declarations
As discussed in Part I, a mark will be deemed generic if it has
come to describe a general class of goods or services: an escalator,
a trampoline, a zipper. In each of the many genericide cases on the
books, either the PTO or a challenger presented evidence to
demonstrate that the challenged mark was, indeed, generic. But in
each of these cases the applicant or registrant sought to rebut this
evidence, and in some cases did so successfully, thereby fending off
the charge of genericism.225 A question that does not appear to have
arisen yet is the legal effect of a party’s own admission of
genericism. In each of the sui-genericide examples described in this
article, the declarant’s conclusory statement is not accompanied by
consumer surveys, bibliometric analyses or dictionary definitions. It
is, rather, a unilateral statement of a legal conclusion by a party (or
a group) that is, at a minimum, interested in the outcome. To what
degree can, or should, we trust an entity that unilaterally claims that
a term is generic?
Absent a formal abandonment mechanism, such as exists under
copyright and patent law, unilateral declarations are given little
weight by the law. Certainly, few would give credence to PepsiCo’s
unsubstantiated and self-serving declaration that COKE is a generic
term for a cola beverage. Why should we give greater weight to such
a statement if it is made by The Coca Cola Company? That is, can
a firm simply declare, without producing relevant evidence, that its
own mark has become generic, without the question being
adjudicated by a competent finder of fact or law?
Pulling this thread further, could such a declaration be used
against others who later sought to register a mark similar to, or
incorporating, the self-declared generic term? That is, even if a
firm’s unilateral declaration regarding the generic nature of a term
could impact that firm’s ability to register or enforce such a term as
a mark, could such a declaration have preclusive effect against
others? The answer to most of these questions today, it seems, is no.
B.

Non-Recognition of Sui-Genericide in Trademark
Proceedings

Likewise, the USPTO has never recognized the legal effect of a
proposed trademark’s inclusion on a list of generic names, whether
published by WHO, USAN, ISO or even the FTC. As noted in Part
x, above, the USPTO Manual of Trademark Examining Procedure
225

See, e.g., Google, Comic.con

48

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3392043

CONTRERAS – SUI-GENERICIDE
(TMEP) makes no mention of USAN or the WHO INN program,
nor does it instruct trademark examiners to consider whether the
inclusion of a proposed trademark on such a list of common names
should give rise to any presumption of genericness.
In the single Trademark Trials and Appeal Board (TTAB) case
mentioning USAN International Drug Names, 226 Smithkline
Beecham opposed a Danish firm’s U.S. application to register the
mark TOPOTECT for a human and veterinary cancer treatment.227 It
argued that the term TOPOTECT was only “a slight misspelling,
abbreviation, or variation of the generic term ‘topotecan’,” which is
listed by USAN (in the form topotecan hydrochloride) as a generic
term for a topoisomerase inhibitor chemotherapy drug.228
Smithkline Beecham emphasized that “both the World Health
Organization and USAN strongly discourage the use of USAN and
INN generic terms as trademarks.”229 While the TTAB
acknowledged that topotecan is a generic term for a pharmaceutical
chemotherapy agent, it did not find that the proposed mark
TOPOTECT would be perceived by the public as a misspelling or
abbreviation of topotecan. 230 Thus, while the challenged mark was
not found to be generic in this case, it at least offers some indication
that the USPTO may take cognizance of the designation of a term as
a generic or common name on a recognized registry or list, even if
only as one piece of evidence supporting a claim for genericide.
What’s more, the fact that the TOPOTECT case, a nonprecedential
TTAB decision, is the only U.S. trademark case in which an
applicant sought to register a USAN common drug name or a variant
thereof suggests that industry norms surrounding the registration of
common drug names is quite strong. In other words, if industry
participants did not view USAN common names as off-limits for
trademark protection, then one might expect a greater number of
attempts to register these names as trademarks and a concomitant
number of TTAB and judicial challenges to those registrations. The
226
Searches for “World Health Organization” and “USAN” on LEXIS “All
Trademark Law Cases” and “All Trademark Law Administrative Materials”
conducted on Apr. 28, 2019 resulted in only one case that mentioned a USAN
common name in connection with a genericism challenge to a trademark. The
WHO INN program was not mentioned at all.
227
Smithkline Beecham PLC v. TopoTarget ApS Corp., 2004 TTAB LEXIS
504 (Sept. 2, 2004) (nonprecedential).
228
Id. at *10-*12. As noted by the TTAB, a “misspelling or variation in a
few letters is far too little to turn a generic term into a protectable trademark”. Id.
at *12 (citing, inter alia, In re Organik Technologies Inc., 41 USPQ2d 1690
(TTAB 1997) (ORGANIK phonetic equivalent to misdescriptive
term
"organic")).
229
Id. at *14.
230
Id. at *23-24.
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relative quiet in this small corner of an otherwise litigious industry
suggests that declarations of sui-genericide, at least in the
pharmaceutical industry, are respected by the players in that
industry.
C.

Reliance and Estoppel

In several of the examples of sui-genericide discussed in this
article, the initial proposal for a generic or common name must be
submitted in writing, often on a standardized application form. For
example, as discussed in Part II.C, the application form for common
pesticide names required the applicant to commit not to claim
trademark rights in the proposed common name and to obtain a
commitment from any relevant trademark holders that the name
would be made available “for unrestricted use.”231
While such a unilateral statement would probably not be
considered a binding contractual commitment, it could have legal
effect under the doctrine of promissory estoppel if others reasonably
relied on it.232 Thus, if other members of the relevant naming
committee relied on the applicant’s representation that a proposed
common name was not, and would not be, subject to a trademark
application when they approved the term as a common name, then
the applicant might later be estopped from asserting that trademark
against others or from arguing that the name was not generic. 233
For example, although the U.S. firms that submitted terms to the
Bureau of Foreign Commerce Generic Word Program did not
themselves make any express representation or commitment
regarding the generic nature of those terms, the Bureau required
some degree of evidence that the terms were “regarded as generic
by the United States industry for the particular types of products on
which they are used.”234 Because it is plausible to assume that this
evidence could also have been used to oppose a U.S. registration of
231

See note 155, supra, and accompanying text.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1) (1981) (“[a] promise
which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the
promise.”)
233
A similar theory has been proposed in connection with the enforcement of
unilateral commitments to license patents that are essential to technical standards
on terms that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). See
Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note x, at 541-46 (arguing that the makers of
such commitments should be legally bound by them under a novel “market
reliance” theory, notwithstanding the difficulty of proving actual reliance by
market participants).
234
Travaglini & Lightman, supra note 101, at 743.
232
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the submitted terms, one can also assume that the firms seeking to
prevent the foreign registration of the term effectively conceded the
genericness of the term in the United States. That is, the American
auto manufacturers who submitted the term DIESEL to the Bureau
could not realistically have expected to obtain a registration of the
term DIESEL. Thus their submission of terms to the Generic Word
Program had the practical effect of an admission of genericness or,
in the alternative, a commitment not to seek registration of the
submitted terms.
While such arguments might prevail against the applicant for a
particular common or generic name, it is less clear that a promissory
estoppel theory would prevent non-applicants from using a common
name as a trademark. In considering this question, it is worth
analyzing separately other members of the relevant naming
committee and uninvolved third parties.
Each of the examples of sui-genericide discussed in this article
involves the collective action, or at least acquiescence, of a group of
interested parties. Thus, with regard to the Generic Word Program,
suggestions for generic words were made to the Bureau by the
USTA, which received these suggestions from its member
companies. Proposals for generic or common names for
pharmaceuticals, pesticides and synthetic fibers, are made by
individual firms, but are then evaluated and published by
committees consisting of members from multiple industry
participants, government and academia (WHO and the USAN
Council for pharmaceuticals, ISO/TC 81 for pesticides and ISO/TC
38 for synthetic fibers). Likewise, statements of sui-genericide for
technical standards have been made by SDOs (USB-IF and W3C),
which are, in effect, trade associations consisting of hundreds of
industry participants.
It is possible that by participating in such a group (whether a
group dedicated to developing common names such as ISO/TC 81
or an SDO responsible for all aspects of a standard such as USB or
HTML), members of the group could be argued to have committed
themselves not to register any name designated as generic by the
group. While this commitment may be weaker than that of the
original applicant for a particular generic name, such an agreement
could be implied from group membership through a promissory
estoppel theory.235
235

Such an argument has also been made in the context of FRAND patent
licensing commitments made within SDOs that do not have formal contractual
arrangements among their members. See Contreras, Market Reliance, supra note
x, at 496-97 (discussing “voluntary SDO declarations” at SDOs such as IETF).
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Even more difficult, however, is the case of non-participants in
the naming group. These parties have no explicit or implicit
commitment to avoid the registration of a common name as a
trademark.236 Thus, in the TTAB matter involving the mark
TOPOTECT, the applicant, a Danish company, did not participate in
the USAN naming process. Smithkline Beecham, however, which
marketed a topotecan hydrochloride product under the brand name
Hycamtin, clearly avoided use of the topotecan generic name in its
brand name.
For all of these reasons, the treatment of common names as
generic on an erga omnes basis would result in a significantly more
robust exclusion of such names as trademarks. One way to achieve
this effect is through cancelation of the relevant mark.
D.

Cancelation Proceedings

As discussed in Part I.B, above, a registered mark may be
challenged on the basis of genericism in a cancelation proceeding
by “a person who believes that he is or will be damaged” by such
registration.237 In order to establish standing to bring a cancelation
proceeding, such a person must allege a “direct and personal stake”
in the outcome of the proceeding,238 and while actual damage need
not be proved to establish standing, the person’s belief that he or she
has been damaged must be more than subjective. 239 In addition, a
registered mark that its owner seeks to enforce may be challenged
as generic by an alleged infringer as an affirmative defense to the
claim of infringement. 240 But none of these administrative or
litigation genericism challenges to registered marks can be initiated
by a mark owner or other interested party. Such cancelations
currently require action by a third party – either through direct
Membership in a group that collectively commits to treat designated names as
generic could also be analogized to a “coordinated pledge” made with respect to
patents. See Contreras, Patent Pledges, supra note 10, at 564-69.
236
In the case of SDO FRAND commitments, such non-participating parties
have been referred to as “outsiders” – market actors that do not participate in
SDOs and are thus not bound by the FRAND and other commitments made by
SDO participants. See Jorge L. Contreras, When a Stranger Calls: Standards
Outsiders and Unencumbered Patents, 12 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 507, xx
(2016).
237
15 U.S.C. § 1064.
238
Empresa Cubana del Tabaco v. General Cigar Co., 111 USPQ2d 1058,
1062 (Fed. Cir. 2014); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d 1023,
1026 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
239
Ritchie, 50 USPQ2d at 1027. See also TTABMP §§ 303.03-04 (June
2018).
240
See notes x, supra.
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opposition to the mark or an infringement in which it counterclaims
by challenging the mark as generic. Moreover, even under these
circumstances, litigation is costly and requires active and
determined parties, which might not always be available.
This is the reason that groups like the Proprietary Association
began more than a half century ago to oppose foreign trademarks
and applications for what they perceived to be generic terms
important to U.S. business. 241 The need for intervention also gave
rise to the Bureau of Foreign Commerce Generic Word Program.242
Though the Bureau did not itself initiate proceedings to oppose or
cancel foreign trademarks or applications, it did provide an expert,
central clearinghouse for petitioning foreign governments to deny
trademark protection for words believed by U.S. companies to be
generic. And while both of these efforts focused on foreign
trademark filings, the FTC’s cancelation action against the U.S.
trademark FORMICA arose from similar considerations. 243 In all of
these cases, actions to cancel registrations for generic marks were
made at the request or suggestion of private sector actors operating
in the relevant industry.
For a variety of reasons, most likely involving cost and changing
government priorities, 244 each of these governmentally-sponsored
genericide programs had been discontinued by the 1980s. Thus,
unless governmental priorities and resources are re-aligned to
support a broad program of genericide challenges to U.S. marks,
direct cancelation proceedings are unlikely to re-emerge as a
significant avenue for eliminating generic marks. The focus thus
returns to mechanisms for strengthening the legal enforceability of
sui-genericide declarations.
E.

Toward Greater Legal Recognition of Sui-Genericide

As noted above, there is currently no reliable way under U.S.
law to ensure that commonly-agreed generic terms are not registered
as trademarks. This Part offers some modest proposals intended to
enhance the legal effect of declarations of sui-genericide.

241

See Part II.A, supra.
See id.
243
See note 63, supra.
244
See Part II.E, supra, discussing U.S. government disengagement from
private standardization efforts.
242
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1. Consensus Lists in Trademark Examination
Though the lists of common names developed by the WHO’s
INN program, the USAN Council, and ISO committees addressing
pesticides and synthetic fibers do not themselves have legal effect,
they demonstrate that industry-led coalitions can develop consensus
lists of common names for new products that are of concern to them.
One way to lend greater legal effect force to these lists (which I term
“Consensus Lists”) would be to enact federal legislation or
regulation officially recognizing Consensus Lists for purposes of
trademark examination and challenge. That is, trademark examiners
could be directed, to inspect Consensus Lists during the examination
process to ascertain whether trademark applications contain terms
that have been determined by relevant industry groups to be generic.
This relatively modest step in the trademark examination procedure
would shift much of the burden of identifying applications for
generic terms from competitors and other interested observers (e.g.,
the private firms who petitioned the USTA to approach the
Department of Commerce during the Generic Word Program) to the
examination process, where it could arguably be accomplished more
efficiently and comprehensively. The examiner’s consultation of
Consensus Lists during examination could also screen out
trademarks on commonly accepted generic terms prior to
registration, thus avoiding the need for more costly opposition and
cancelation proceedings after trademarks have been issued.
In order to elicit the greatest amount of relevant evidence during
examination, it would also be useful for the examiner to notify the
relevant naming body when he or she identifies a potential mark that
is identical or confusingly similar to a common name included in a
Consensus List. This notice would make the naming body aware of
the potential trademark and enable it to produce evidence regarding
the duration and extent of generic use of the name in the industry.
2.

A Presumption of Genericism

A requirement that the generic names included in Consensus
Lists be considered during the trademark examination process
would ensure that these generic names are not overlooked by the
trademark examiner. However, the work of consensus-based
naming groups could be given even greater legal weight if a legal
presumption were created, either through federal statute or judicial
action, that the names included in such Consensus Lists be accorded
a rebuttable presumption of genericism for all purposes, including
in litigation. That is, if a common name is included in a Consensus
List it would be presumed to be generic, and an application that
54
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sought to register that common name (or a term confusingly similar
to a common name) would be deemed ineligible for registration
unless the applicant presented convincing evidence that the
requested mark was distinctive. 245 This requirement would serve to
flush out, at an early stage, any evidence held by the applicant that
its proposed mark is not generic.
Such a presumption of genericness need not be limited to the
trademark examination stage. It could also provide benefits in
trademark oppositions and cancelation proceedings. That is, just as
in an examination, a common name appearing in a Consensus List
would be presumptively generic for purposes of challenging a
trademark that was identical or confusingly similar to the common
name. As a result, such trademarks would be susceptible to
cancelation unless the registrant could produce convincing evidence
that the term is distinctive as to source and not generic.
An alternative approach might defer the presumption until some
time period (e.g., five years) has elapsed during which the common
term has remained on the list without challenge (e.g., by the owner
of a mark issued before the designation of the mark as a common
term). This waiting period would be similar to the period that
descriptive marks must wait to acquire distinctiveness before
becoming registrable on the Principal Register.246 The value of such
a waiting period would be to ensure the stability of the entries on the
Consensus List that are accorded a presumption of genericness,
particularly if there is a public comment or challenge period after
entries first appear on the list.
The creation of a presumption of genericness would give
substantial weight to the sui-genericide declarations made via
Consensus Lists. In many ways, this weighing of the scales seems
fair, given both the overall efficiencies to be achieved by preventing
the capture of generic terms as trademarks, and the persuasive
weight of an industry consensus regarding the terminology of the
relevant field.
3.

Due Process in the Development of Consensus Lists

Naturally, if Consensus Lists are to be accorded significant legal
deference, as proposed in the preceding discussion, then it is
245
See, e.g., Smithkline Beecham PLC v. TopoTarget ApS Corp., 2004
TTAB LEXIS 504 (Sept. 2, 2004) (nonprecedential) (considering whether the
proposed mark TOPOTECT was only “a slight misspelling, abbreviation, or
variation of the generic term ‘topotecan’”).
246
Lanham Act §§ 23-28, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1091-1096.
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particularly important to ensure that the development of such
Consensus Lists is conducted in a manner that will be deemed to be
representative of the relevant industry and not organized to
advantage particular competitors or commercial interests.247 Thus,
even if significant deference is given to the determinations of
consensus-based naming bodies, this deference must be tempered
with due regard to potential anticompetitive conduct by such groups.
In order to assure a suitable level of representativeness among
the developers of Consensus Lists, it would not be unreasonable to
require that consensus-developing groups, and their procedures,
comply with certain minimum “due process” procedures and
requirements in order to be recognized. Such due process
requirements are already imposed on SDOs in many contexts, and
include requirements that such organizations operate on an open,
balanced and transparent basis, that standards are developed based
on consensus-based processes, and that mechanisms exist for
participants to appeal or contest particular decisions.248 Likewise,
such due process mechanisms are required of any SDO that wishes
to be accredited by the American National Standards Institute
(ANSI) as a developer of American National Standards. 249 The
review of such groups and procedures could be conducted by a
governmental agency such as the USPTO or the National Institute
for Standards and Technology (NIST), or an impartial nongovernmental agency such as ANSI.
At the outset, official recognition of Consensus Lists could be
conferred selectively on lists of names developed by wellestablished naming groups such as those discussed in this article
(e.g., USAN Council (pharmaceuticals), ISO/TC 81 (pesticides) and
247

Unfortunately, industry groups have been known throughout history to
engage in coercive and collusive practices designed not to further the best interests
of the industry, but to advantage particular competitors or groups of competitors.
See, e.g., George S. Cary & Daniel P. Culley, Concerted Action in StandardSetting in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF TECHNICAL STANDARDIZATION LAW:
COMPETITION, ANTITRUST, AND PATENTS, 78 (Jorge L. Contreras, ed., 2018)
(describing cases of anticompetitive collusion in standard-setting).
248
These “due process” characteristics are generally required in order for
SDOs and their standards to be recognized by certain governmental bodies and
are viewed as prudent, if not mandatory, to operate in compliance with applicable
antitrust and competition laws. See Justus Baron et al., Making the Rules: The
Governance of Standard Development Organizations and their Policies on
Intellectual Property Rights, JRC Science for Policy Report EUR 29655 at x
(Mar. 2019).
249
AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., ANSI ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS: DUE
PROCESS REQUIREMENTS FOR AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS § 3.1.1, 10–11
(2019) [hereinafter ANSI Essential Requirements] (an SDO must conform to the
ANSI Essential Requirements in order to be recognized as a developer of
American National Standards).
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ISO/TC 38 (textiles)) as well as recognized SDOs such as USB-IF
and W3C. Later, a procedure could be established whereby
additional groups could apply for such recognition after
demonstrating their representation of a significant industry sector
and their compliance with the due process requirements described
above.
Another question relevant to this proposal is whether
declarations of sui-genericide should be accepted not only from
representative industry bodies, but also from individual firms or
persons. For example, could Adobe unilaterally declare, with the
same legal effect as an international naming body, that its mark PDF
is generic? Many of the same justifications for allowing collective
declarations exist with respect to such unilateral declarations.
However, one could argue that the law should give less weight to
unilateral declarations than to declarations that represent a
consensus view of a particular industry. That is, while a unilateral
declaration may represent the view of one particular company, other
companies in the industry may disagree (perhaps vehemently) with
the declaring company’s assessment of a term as generic (consider
the Pepsi-Coke hypothetical posed in Part IV.A above). With a
Consensus List, so long as the naming body is sufficiently
representative of the relevant industry, there is a greater likelihood
that the terms selected as generic would have more general
acceptance and less opposition from competitors.
4.

Implementation: Legislation versus Regulation

The proposals outlined in this article with respect to the
consideration and recognition of Consensus Lists could be
implemented in several ways. First, and most directly, Congress
could amend the Lanham Act to impose such requirements on the
USPTO and to create a legal presumption of genericness associated
with names included on Consensus Lists. However, Congressional
action – always difficult and complex to achieve -- is not necessarily
required to effectuate many of the components of this proposal.
With regard to the consideration of generic names included in
Consensus Lists during trademark examination, the USPTO could
implement such a requirement through amendments to the Rules of
Practice in Trademark Cases,250 codified in the Code of Federal
Regulations (CFR) and modified frequently through agency notice
and comment rulemaking.251 It is also possible that at least a
250

37 C.F.R. Part 2- Rules of Practice in Trademark Cases.
See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Rule Making: Trademark Federal
Register Notices and Comments, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/laws251
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requirement that trademark examiners consult Consensus Lists
during trademark examination could be effected through a simple
amendment to the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure,252 a
comprehensive guidance document for trademark examiners,
applicants and attorneys that is updated frequently.253 While an
amendment to the TMEP could not create a general presumption of
genericness arising from declarations of sui-genericide, it would be
a relatively painless first step that could, at a minimum, serve to
direct examiner attention to such declarations – a significant
improvement over current practice.

5.

International Harmonization

As indicated by continuing efforts of the USTR in the area of
foreign registration of generic and common names,254 there is little
international harmonization of the treatment of generic and common
names.255 Yet the development of common names in an increasing
array of product categories is international in nature. 256 It would thus
be worthwhile for the USTR and USPTO to urge their foreign
counterparts, through existing international cooperative channels, to
consider the adoption of the examination and presumption proposals
discussed in Subparts 1 and 2 above with respect to Consensus Lists
of common names.
The recognition of consensus-based common names as
ineligible for trademark registration is not unknown internationally,
and in fact many foreign trademark offices give greater deference to
such common names than the USPTO. For example, The EU
Intellectual Property Office treats as non-registrable “trade marks
which consist of, or reproduce in their essential elements, an earlier
plant variety denomination registered in accordance with Union
regulations/rule-making-trademark-federal-register-notices-and-comments
(accessed May 19, 2019).
252
TMEP, supra note 52.
253
See U.S. Pat. & Trademark Off., Trademark Manual of Examining
Procedure – Files and Archives, https://www.uspto.gov/trademark/guides-andmanuals/tmep-archives (accessed May 19, 2019) (TMEP updated 17 times since
2010).
254
See Part II.E, supra.
255
For a discussion of the need for greater international harmonization in the
recognition of foreign language generic terms, see Brauneis & Moerland, supra
note 107.
256
E.g., the WHO INN program for pharmaceutical common names (see Part
II.B, supra), ISO/TC 38 for textile fibers (see Part II.D, supra), ISO/TC 81 for
pesticides (see Part II.C, supra), the Codex Alimentarius Commission for
foodstuffs (see note 178, supra), and a range of technology-focused SDOs
including W3C, ETSI, IEEE-SA and others.
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legislation or national law, or international agreements to which the
Union or the Member State concerned is a party, providing for
protection of plant variety rights, and which are in respect of plant
varieties of the same or closely related species.”257 Likewise, law
and regulation in numerous countries prohibit the registration of
WHO-recognized INNs and other common names as trademarks.258
Accordingly, international harmonization of the proposed measures
may be easier to achieve than initial adoption in the U.S.

CONCLUSION
Unlike patent and copyright law, which offer mechanisms by
which inventions and works of authorship may be dedicated to the
public domain, trademark law offers no explicit mechanism by
which parties may place a particular word, term or device into the
public domain. Yet for more than half a century, private parties have
voluntarily been designating words and terms as generic – the
practice of sui-genericide. This practice yields several potential
benefits to the market, including the creation of common terms by
which all participants in a market can refer to their products while
using proprietary brands to differentiate themselves and compete
with one another. The designation of these common terms as generic
may also have the benefit of preventing others from registering such
terms as trademarks, but current legal theories, including promissory
estoppel, do not unequivocally render such terms generic for all
purposes. Accordingly, this article proposes several measures that
could be implemented either through federal legislation or judicial
action to enhance the legal recognition of declarations of suigenericide. These include official recognition and consideration
during trademark prosecution of “consensus” lists of common terms
that are developed by broadly-representative industry groups and the
creation of a presumption of genericness for terms that appear on
such lists. Coupled with international harmonization of the
treatment of sui-genericide, such measures could reduce consumer
search costs, enhance competition among producers of standardized
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Eur. Union Trademark Reg., 2017/1001, Art. 7(1)(m) (Absolute Grounds
for Refusal). See also Eur. Union Intell. Prop. Off., Guidelines For Examination
Of European Union Trade Marks, Part B – Examination, Section 4 - Absolute
Grounds For Refusal, Chapter 13 - Trade Marks In Conflict With Earlier Plant
Variety Denominations (Jan. 10, 2017).
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See, e.g., Indian Trademark Act of 1999, Sec. 13; Andean Community,
Decision 486/2000 (Establishing the Common Intellectual Property Regime),
Article 135(f) (“Those signs may not be registered as marks that: … (f) consist
solely of a sign or statement which is the generic or technical name of the product
or service concerned”).
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products, and bring increased efficiency to markets that depend on
the unencumbered availability of common names.
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